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I. INTRODUCTION

Professors Rochelle Dreyfuss and Stephen Subrin first presented their
ideas on the 1993 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(Civil Rules) at the 1994 Annual Meeting of the Association of American
Law Schools (AALS) in a program titled, "The 1993 Discovery Amendments: Evolution, Revolution, or Devolution?"' After the program, I was
left with the depressing view that the answer was devolution, which is
defined as a "retrograde evolution," or "degeneration." 2 Dreyfuss provides
a detailed but succinct review of the changes in discovery occasioned by
the new rules as well as a vantage point for assessing the social and political forces behind this unusually controversial rulemaking event. She not
only describes the tortured history of problematic Civil Rules amendments4 but she also implies that this problematic history should prompt

1. Editor's Note: THE AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND FORMS

were originally published in a House Document at H.R. Doc. NO. 74, 103d Cong., IstSess. 98
(1993). The House Document appears in its entirety at AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE, 146 F.R.D. 401. The Florida Law Review has elected to cite to Federal Rules Decisions
for the sake of efficiency. The reprinted in form is used throughout the symposium issue to refer to
the original publication of the material in House Document form, however, the citation to H.R. Doc.
No. 74 will appear only in the initial citation to the amendments in each article. Thereafter, the citation will be to AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 146 F.R.D. 401. As a final
note, portions of the material are also in the Interim Edition of the 114th volume of Supreme Court
Reporter.
2. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 348 (1988). This is the secondary mean-

ing of devolution. Id. The primary meaning is transfer of power from a central government to local
authorities. Id. Ironically, the 1993 Amendments are to some degree devolutionary in this sense as
well, in that they permit individual federal district courts to opt out of the system of initial disclosure
and presumptive limits on interrogatories or depositions.
3. Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The What and Why of the New Discovery Rules, 46 FLA. L. REV. 9.
11-15 (1994).
4. Id.at 9-10.
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the profession to rethink the rulemaking process.5 Subrin convincingly
suggests that the 1993 Amendments will not do much good6 and advances
an alternative vision of discovery reform," a proposal he thinks will both
respond to perceived problems with American litigation and militate
against the increasingly partisan politicization of Civil Rules revision.'
When Dreyfuss and Subrin presented their papers, civil procedure and
litigation professors 9 reacted with vigor and engaged in animated discussion during the informal question period following the presentations."0
The need to leave time for the second panel of the program curtailed the

professors' discussion." Obviously, the legal profession remains engaged
in the discovery reform debate even though the momentary political storm
over the latest Civil Rules amendments' 2 subsided when the amended
rules took effect December 1, 1993.'" Although it remains possible that

5. See id. at 10.
6. Stephen N. Subrin, Fudge Points and Thin Ice in Discovery Reform and the Case for Selective Substance-Specific Procedure,46 FLA. L. REv. 27, 28 (1994).
7. Id. at 28-29.
8. Id.
9. Professors Stephen Burbank (University of Pennsylvania), David Crum (University of Houston), Howard Fink (Ohio State University), Richard Marcus (University of California), John Oakley
(University of California-Davis), Liz Schneider (Brooklyn Law School), and Edward Sherman (University of Texas) made valuable comments prior to the session's end.
10. Despite the varied viewpoints of this group of diverse scholars, the general consensus of the
law professor audience appeared to accord with the view that the 1993 discovery amendments would
not be successful. Participants diverged, however, regarding their reaction to Subrin's proposal for substance-specific discovery guidelines.
11. The second panel included Judges William Bertelsman (W.D. Ky.), Norma Shapiro (E.D.
Pa.), and Barrington Parker (S.D.N.Y), then still in private practice, and Legal Defense Fund litigator
Bill Lee, with Professor Minna Kotkin (Brooklyn Law School) moderating.
12. Although the AALS program focused on changes in the discovery rules, particularly the new
disclosure requirements, the package has other important aspects. Most notably, FED. R. CtV. P. 11
was revised, largely to reduce its potential in terroremeffect, yet some aspects of the rule were made
more stringent. See FED. R. Ctv. P. 11 advisory committee's note. Rule 16 was amended to make the
trial judge's case management powers available at the pretrial conference more explicit. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's note. Rule 4 was amended to establish a "waiver of service" procedure, to provide expanded service and personal jurisdiction in some cases, and to establish the primacy
of international agreements governing service such as the Hague Convention. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4
advisory committee's note. Rule 54 was altered to require that counsel seeking attorney's fees act
within 14 days of judgment. See FED. R. Civ. P. 54 advisory committee's note. In a related change,
Rule 58 was amended to permit the court to either decide the fees issue alone or delay appellate review on the merits, so that both the merits and any appeal on fees can be heard together. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 58 advisory committee's note. Some of these changes, particularly those regarding Rule 11, are
touched upon later in this article concerning the political reciprocity imbedded in the 1993 package of
civil rules amendments. See infra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
13. Although the storm may have subsided, it has hardly dissolved. When the new rules took
effect, many of the federal district courts quickly exercised their prerogatives under new Rule 26(a)(1)
to exempt themselves from the new disclosure regime and their prerogatives under new Rule 26(b)(2)
to suspend, alter or add to the presumptive limits on interrogatories and depositions. Marcia Coyle &
Marianne Lavelle, Half of Districts Opt Out of New Civil Rules, NAT'L LJ., Feb. 28, 1994, at 5.
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the new disclosure and discovery rules will defy the predictions of their
critics, I find this unlikely. Time will prove Dreyfuss, Subrin, and other
critics correct in their misgivings. In this article, instead of echoing others'
criticisms of the 1993 Amendments, I hope to place the 1993 Amendments in broader issues of the current litigation reform debate and to specifically ask of Subrin's proposal the same questions posed about the 1993
Amendments: Is it evolution, revolution, or devolution?
In Part II of this article, I address several problems with the current
debate over civil litigation reform which Dreyfuss' and Subrin's articles
highlighted. Part III focuses on the merits and possible attainment of
Subrin's proposal. In Part IV, I suggest that Subrin's proposal, although it
has merit and should be explored in earnest, is plainly not enough to pull
litigation reform out of its present mire. 4 To truly be reformed or rejuvenated, the litigation system needs an infusion of renewed institutional
focus. This focus must be possessed of something akin to a civically republican vision of lawyering coupled with a more stable mechanism for
hearing all voices of the profession, and the clientele the profession serves,
in an institutionalized, deliberative pluralism of litigation reform. Additionally, judges and lawyers must acknowledge that the two-decade ascendancy of the "case management" approach has failed in important respects
and that lawyers and judges must focus their energies on what they do
best-litigation and adjudication.

Among those districts which opted out are major litigation centers such as New York, Philadelphia,
Chicago, and Los Angeles. See Alfred W. Cortese, Jr., Mandatory Disclosure Rule 26(a)(1): Variety
Reigns, 498 PLI Litig. & Admin. Prac. Course Handbook Series-Litig (PLI) 425 (1994), available in
WESTLAW, PLI-LIT database. Many other district courts expressed interest in modifying at least a
portion of the new Rules. See Districts' Develop Myriad of Responses to Federal Rules Changes,
INSIDE LITIG., Feb.-Mar. 1994, at 8. Even in districts that have completely suspended the discovery
changes, the courts have treated the decision as subject to review. See J. Stratton Shartel & Christine
Housen, Focus Remains on Local Rules Despite New Federal Disclosure Provisions, INSIDE LITIG.,
Dec. 1993, at 1. The battle over disclosure and discovery limits may thus continue in local theaters of
combat rather than before Congress.
A spokesman for the Administrative Office of the United States Courts attempted to minimize
these defections, contending that the local opt-outs resulted largely from the previous success of similar rules contained in many of the districts' Delay and Expense Reduction Plans mandated by the Civil
Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. V 1993) [hereinafter Biden Bill, for Sen.
Joseph Biden (D-Del.), its principal sponsor and advocate]. Coyle & Lavelle, supra, at 5 (reporting the
comments of David Sellers). This is wishful thinking. Although some of the opting out districts may
have viewed the 1993 disclosure/discovery changes as superfluous or in conflict with local Biden Bill
plans, many others, such as the important Southern District of New York, opted out and had previously rejected disclosure in their Biden Bill plans. Shartel & Housen, supra, at i. The inevitable conclusion is that many district courts simply do not like the 1993 Amendments and were eager to opt out
when given the opportunity.
14. 1 do not mean to imply that Subrin himself makes grand claims for his proposal. He is modest in suggesting that it would help, but does not describe it as a panacea. See Subrin, supra note 6, at
56.
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MISDIRECTED MANEUVERS: THE FUNDAMENTAL
OVERSIGHTS OF LITIGATION REFORMERS

In this diverse stew of concern over pretrial fact development, it appears to me that the legal profession, particularly those members with the
greatest control over the process, has drifted into analytical ruts on several
litigation reform issues. I discuss these issues below.
A. The Various Segments of the Profession Fail to Appreciate
Both the Relative Needs of One Another and the
Manner in Which a Given Segment of the Profession
Will Actually React to Rules Changes5
The disclosure/discovery changes of 1993 are an unfortunately problematic example of a tendency in the profession toward self-absorption. 6
Judges generally want discovery streamlined but want attorneys to do the
streamlining, a formidable task after a quarter-century of lax discovery
practice, with minimal court supervision. Consequently, the bench wants
to change discovery practice by altering the Civil Rules in one fell swoop.
In advocating such an approach to discovery practice change, the bench
avoids the more arduous and less glamorous task of supervising discovery
by ruling firmly, promptly, and fairly on the discovery disputes brought to
court. Instead of taking a brick-by-brick approach toward building
litigation's imagined new "City on the Hill," the 1993 rulemakers have
placed their faith in the "magic bullet" of disclosure and have fixed presumptive limits on discovery, regardless of the type of case in question.
The new amendments do provide for judicial power and discretion," but
15. I have addressed this point at some length in Jeffrey W. Stempel, Cultural Literacy and the
Adversary System: The EnduringProblems of Distrust,Misunderstanding,and Narrow Perspective,27

VAL. U. L. REv. 313, 316-42 (1993) [hereinafter Stempel, Cultural Literacy]. The present article concludes, much like Dreyfuss's invocation of Tolstoy, Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 25, that elements of the
bench, the bar, and legislators are each so focused on their own unhappiness and pressures that they
fail to recognize, or perhaps even to seek, the larger common good of a better functioning litigation
system. See infra notes 165-81 and accompanying text (discussing the role of public-spirited "civic
virtue" in litigation reform).
16. Law teachers and scholars are undoubtedly guilty of this self-interested focus, too, but less so
than judges and lawyers, at least in my view. For example, most law professors who have spoken to
the issue have criticized the 1993 Rules changes, see supra notes 3 & 6, even though these changes
will largely benefit law professors, at least in a narrow, self-interested way. Because of the changes,
law professors have something new to teach, are positioned to acquire "ground floor" expertise about
new rules, and have a market for new or updated scholarly work. For example, a book on which I am
a coauthor is being published in a third edition just two years after the second edition largely to address the 1993 Rules changes. See ROGER S. HAYDOCK ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF PRETRIAL LITIGAT1ON (3d ed.) (forthcoming 1994). Notwithstanding these advantages, law professors worked against
adoption of the rules changes. But as a practical matter, the behavior of law professors is far less important than that of judges and lawyers in determining what actually occurs in civil rules revision.
17. Indeed, most of the Civil Rules amendments and other litigation changes of the past two
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the changes slant toward invoking that power and discretion for case management rather than for case adjudication. My fear is that the City on the
Hill sought by the 1993 Amendments will turn out to be a Potemkin Village.' 8
Practicing lawyers have hardly been blameless or public-spirited in
bringing on the current murky status quo of pretrial fact development.
Although in my view critics confer scapegoat status on lawyers too quickly, critics are correct in noting that lawyers can, through strategic behavior
and avarice, engage in excessive discovery pursuit or resistance.' 9 However, as Subrin convincingly observes, the 1993 Amendments adopt the
"attorney-as-the-problem" presumption but then paradoxically attempt to
fix the problem by placing more responsibility on lawyers to get the discovery house in order through a de facto "honor system" of disclosure."
In addition, the aim of the rule changes-reducing discovery to what is
necessary rather than what is profitable for counsel-is unlikely to be
achieved by depending on counsel to work against presumptive limits on
depositions or interrogatories. Only strong judicial supervision2' or market forces beyond the control of the rulemakers22 will make much prog-

decades have looked toward judicial discretion as a means of curing the system's shortcomings. See
Edward Brunet, The Triumph of Efficiency and Discretion Over Competing Complex Litigation Policies, 10 REV. LtTIG. 273, 297-308 (1991).
18. My misgivings about the 1993 changes are not new. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, New Paradigm,
Normal Science, or Crumbling Construct? Trends in Adjudicatory Procedure and Litigation Reform,
59 BROOK. L. REV. 659, 674-83 (1993) [hereinafter Stempel, New Paradigm]. Both Dreyfuss' and
Subrin's papers have, however, increased my misgivings by highlighting additional problematic aspects of the changes. See supra notes 3, 6. Justice Scalia's statement in dissent of the discovery
amendments' adoption has proven increasingly correct. Dissenting Statement of Justice Scalia, in H.R.
Doc. NO. 74, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 98 (1993), reprinted in AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE, 146 F.R.D. 401, 507-13 (1993) [hereinafter AMENDMENTS] (indicating the changes
to Rule 11 would render it "toothless" and that changes to Rule 26 would add new layers of discovery, not reduce unnecessary delay and expense). Except for the rulemakers, almost no one else in the
profession has much hope for the new disclosure/discovery provisions. Id.
19. See Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Characterof Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals
for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1303 (1978); Civil Litigation in the Twenty-First Century: A
Panel Discussion,59 BROOK. L. REV. 1199, 1217-18 (1994) [hereinafter Panel Discussion] (comments
of Attorney Kenneth R. Feinberg) (asserting that only by finding ways to control the lure of large
counsel fees in certain types of cases presenting inordinate strain on the litigation system will participants achieve substantial litigation efficiencies).
20. Subrin, supra note 6, at 42-43.
21. See Panel Discussion, supra note 19, at 1221 (comments of Kenneth R. Feinberg) (asserting
that in addition to attempting to control incentives toward excessive litigation created by potential exorbitant counsel fees, system requires what another panelist described as "judges with backbone").
22. For example, a number of clients have pushed for alternatives to hourly billing, see Robert E.
Litan & Steven C. Salop, Reforming the Lawyer-Client Relationship Through Alternative Billing Methods, 77 JUDICATURE 191 (1994), while some law firms have begun to offer their services under a
package rate, "value billing" or other fee arrangements. See ZoE Baird, A Client's Experience with
Implementing Value Billing, 77 JUDICATURE 198 (1994). As anyone who has glanced at the trade press
of the past decade knows, this has been a virtual personal crusade of American Lawyer publisher Ste-
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ress toward reduced discovery, even if one assumes a more public-spirited
bar.
The solution to the Gordian Knot of self-interest does not lie in attempting to slice through the congestion by decreeing changes in the discovery rules like those of the 1993 Amendments. Already it is apparent
that the Civil Rules Advisory Committee has been considerably less successful than Alexander the Great.' Rather than rely on Delphic solutions

yen Brill. See, e.g., Steven Brill, The New Leverage, AM. LAW., July/Aug. 1993, at 5 (describing economic incentives toward leaner case staffing and streamlined discovery for firms willing to depart
from profit-making premised on associate leveraging); John E. Morris, Two Pioneers Make a FixedFee Deal Work, AM. LAW., Dec. 1993, at 5 (describing agreement where Alcoa committed all litigation to the LeBeouf law firm for three years for a flat fee of between $6-7 million in lieu of the prior
hourly billing arrangements).
To the extent that the marketplace for legal services encourages payment of lawyers based on
efficiency rather than inefficiency, this is progress. But progress of this kind requires sophisticated
clients who know the difference between getting inadequate representation at a cheaper price and
getting real value for services. It also will occur largely independently of Civil Rules amendments, at
least the type of amendments embodied in the 1993 Amendments.
In addition, the traditional contingent fee of plaintiff's personal injury lawyers can certainly be
seen as an incentive toward efficiency. This is because it provides motivation to minimize discovery
unless counsel expects the information obtained to increase the size of the award. Unfortunately, contingent fee arrangements may create incentives to bring marginal cases that would otherwise not be
brought or may prompt counsel to "blackmail" the opposition into settlement by increasing discovery
demands. My own view is that the defense bar has cried wolf in making this argument. To be successful, blackmail requires a victim who will yield to it. If defendants based their settlement decisions
solely on the merits of the claim, plaintiff's counsel would find it too inefficient (and likely to result in
sanctions) to engage in discovery abuse simply to "up the ante" for settlement.
Fee application arrangements could also be a vehicle for encouraging streamlined discovery.
They probably will not be used, however, as long as the courts employ the "lodestar" approach. See
Arnold M. Quittner, Employment and Compensation of Appointed Professionals,688 PLI Com. Litig.
& Practice Course Handbook Series (PLI) 445 (1994), available in WESTLAW, PLI-Comm database.
This method which calculates fee awards based largely on counsel's hourly rate and time spent on the
case-a strong incentive to overlawyer a matter to pad a planned fee petition. Id. Although courts appear to be moving away from this to some degree in class action litigation that creates a common fund
or common benefit to the class, see, e.g., O'Neill v. Church's Fried Chicken, 910 F.2d 263, 265 (5th
Cir. 1990), the lodestar continues to rule in most fee petition matters, such as civil rights or discrimination litigation. Rethinking this area of counsel fees law-with a sensitivity to the particular discovery problems in such cases and the role of these laws in vindicating dignitary interests that may not
result in large monetary awards-might do more to streamline litigation than any global change in
Rule 26. An exciting extension of Subrin's proposal, see supra note 6, would be to use it in crafting
presumptive rules of fee shifting and assessment, as well as discovery rights and responsibilities, in
such cases.
23. But the Committee has had a longer life. The Advisory Committee has enjoyed permanent
status for nearly 40 years. Many lawyers feel it was a mistake to institutionalize the Advisory Committee. See Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospectsfor ProceduralProgress,59
BROOK. L. REv. 761, 761 (1993). Once given ongoing existence, they argue, it was inevitable that the
Committee would strain to find something to do on an ongoing basis. Id.
Although the danger noted is real, I support an ongoing Advisory Committee. Litigation rules
should receive consistent scrutiny. The solution to the potential "over-amendment" problem is restraint
by both the Advisory Committee and those reviewing its work, such as the Standing Committee, the
Judicial Conference, the Supreme Court, and Congress. Although the path of the 1993 Amendments
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(to continue the ancient Greek metaphors), a structured dialogue between
judges, scholars, interest groups, clients, and lawyers from all segments of
the field, would better serve the litigation system. Such a dialogue between the diverse entities interested in litigation should occur during the
early stages of reform proposals, not as after-the-fact electioneering maneuvers designed to thwart proposed changes or push them over the top.2 4
B. Efforts to Alter Litigation Have Reflexively Been in the
Vein of Case Management and Settlement Brokering
Rather Than the Potentially More Fruitful
Areas of Adjudication and Enforcement"
The 1980s and 1990s have seen a relative flurry of Civil Rules
amendment activity including amendments that beef up Rule 11, expand
Rule 16 conferences and case administration, mandate disclosure and
presumptively limited discovery, encourage enhanced pretrial disposition,
and establish restrictions on class action practice. Additionally, some have
suggested modifying Rule 68, moving in the direction of the English Rule
on fee-shifting. 6 At the same time, judicial vacancies have remained
open for months or years with modest expenditures directed toward expanding the courts' adjudicatory capacity. Prestigious judges and organizations such as the Federal Courts Study Committee have called for a
strictly limited federal judiciary, perhaps capped at 1000 judges.27 In ad-

detailed by Dreyfuss creates some cause for pessimism, see supra notes 4-5, I remain optimistic that
all five of these institutions can recover from the excessive tinkering of the 1980s, in which the disclosure scheme had its origin, and return to a regime of "if it's not broke, don't fix it" that had previously prevailed in the system. In the midst of the amendment mania, for example, the Standing Committee refused to endorse Advisory Committee revisions of summary judgment under Rule 56 which
would have essentially told lawyers how to write their motion papers. See Carl Tobias, Collision
Course in Federal Civil Discovery, 145 F.R.D. 139, 139 (1993).
24. I have elsewhere proposed several specific changes in the rulemaking process in order to
meaningfully broaden participation and to ensure that it occurs earlier in the rulemaking process. See
Stempel, New Paradigm,supra note 18, at 737-59. I address this proposal at length in this article. See
infra part IV.
25. I have developed this point at great length in Stempel, New Paradigm,supra note 18, at 71437 (arguing that American litigation has moved from an open courts adjudicatory model of litigation
toward a more restrictive model, thereby raising barriers to access and encouraging settlement rather
than decision).
26. See, e.g., A REPORT FROM THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR
CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN AMERICA 19, 24 (1991) (endorsing English Rule generally); William W
Schwarzer, Fee-Shifting Offers of Judgment-An Approach to Reducing the Cost of Litigation, 76
JUDICATURE 147, 149 (1992 (advocating partial use of the English Rule).
27. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
STUDY COMMITTEE 6-8 (1990) (stating that to be adequately expert, prestigious, and cohesive, the
federal bench must not be much larger than its present size); Jon 0. Newman, 1,000 Judges-The
Limit for an Effective Federal Judiciary, 76 JUDICATURE 187, 187 (1993) (Chief Judge of the Second
Circuit urges that the federal judiciary have an absolute ceiling of 1000 judges). The Long-Range
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dition, a large alternative dispute resolution network has emerged as businesses frequently stipulate to arbitrate disputes and courts have expanded
court-annexed arbitration.' Mediation has proven popular as well. If this
much energy had been directed toward actually hearing and deciding cases, perhaps today's supposedly tottering system could have been restored
to glory. My view is that when an adjudicatory system adjudicates, settlements will follow as a matter of course.29
Apart from the largely empirical, but yet unanswered, question of
whether a looming trial date or case management is more likely to reduce
caseloads, rulemakers and litigation reformers should ask themselves a few

hard questions about professional competence. For example, what is it that
judges and lawyers do best? Although judging and lawyering require some
minimum level of organizational skill,3" both jobs and the training for
them focus upon knowledge of law, intelligence, writing skills, persuasive
powers, and the like. Subrin is correct in suggesting that what judges do
best is adjudicate. 3 Absent some individual serendipity, there is no reason to expect that a lawyer who becomes a judge will be a good manager.
Yet, perversely, the thrust of the past decade's rulemaking activity has
aimed to expand the judge's case management role as the means to im-

proving litigation. This raises obvious problems of fairness, problems
others have well-chronicled.32 In addition, the aim of judicial case man-

Planning Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States, although it has issued no formal
papers yet for public comment, has tentatively decided not to endorse a specific numerical limit, but
will urge that future growth of the federal bench be strictly limited. Interview with Judicial Conference
staff (Jan. 26, 1994).
28. Kim Dayton, The Myth of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the FederalCourts, 76 IOWA L.
REV. 889, 898-905 (1991).
29. See id. at 957 (finding that statistical analyses exposes the myth of alternative dispute
resolution's effectiveness). Accord Lisa Bernstein, Understandingthe Limits of Court-ConnectedADR:
A Critique of Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 2169, 2215-39
(1993).
30. To belabor the obvious by extreme example: A judge who routinely engages in unrealistic
scheduling or loses the parties' briefs might well be considered a bad judge notwithstanding his or her
intellectual pedigree and talents; a lawyer who routinely misses filing deadlines or is late for court is a
bad lawyer no matter what his or her other attributes.
31. See Subrin, supra note 6, at 50.
32. See e.g., Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARv. L. REv. 374, 385 (1982) (criticizing
managerial judging because questions of fairness arise when a judge hears a case and then renders
judgment on it after advising the parties to settle). See generally Symposium on Litigation Management, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 305 (1986) (canvassing the potential for arbitrariness inherent in managerial
judging). Notwithstanding the ongoing debate over judicial management, the steady drift of rules
amendment and litigation reform efforts have been toward more management. For example, under the
1993 Amendments to Rule 16, lawyers must have a pretrial planning meeting with the judge if the
judge finds the meeting would expedite the case and discourage wasteful pretrial activities. See FED.
R. CIv. P. 16 advisory committee's note. Any plans and disagreements between the parties must be
addressed by the judge at this initial pretrial conference, an event at which the judge is encouraged to
plot out the entire path of the litigation by issuing a pretrial scheduling order. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16
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agement raises questions of misplaced effort and diluted resources. If judging is what judges do best, then judges should be spending as much of the
working day as possible judging.33 Is the system really better served
when, instead of deciding discovery and summary judgment motions, the
judge talks about planning them with counsel?
Although running hopelessly against the zeitgeist, I remain suspicious
of the benefits allegedly resulting from judges spending time on pretrial
conferences and case management rather than adjudication. Consequently,
I am attracted to Subrin's proposal. Subrin designed the proposal not so
much to have judges administer their cases but to decide them. 4 Under
Subrin's proposal, the judge's decisionmaking is guided by presumptive
entitlements to, and limits upon, discovery which various members of the
legal community who are expert and interested in such cases have tailored
to particular classes of cases.35 At the same time, the judge retains discretion to disregard or alter such limits and entitlements. 6 By using these
presumptive discovery guidelines, judges can spend less time administering their cases and more time adjudicating them.
Here and elsewhere, I have consistently criticized the judiciary's disinterest in supervising discovery by swiftly deciding discovery disputes,
shifting fees under the clear language of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 37, and using a fairly narrow view of what constitutes a "substantially justified" discovery request or resistance.37 Notwithstanding the sweep
of Rule 37, judges remain relatively disinterested in policing discovery
disputes. Sometimes a change in the rules will trigger new or renewed
interest. For example, Rule 11 was a virtual dead letter until the 1983
Amendment. Although the 1983-1993 Rule 11 language empowered courts
to more closely police frivolous claims, the real impact of Rule 11 was
that it sparked judicial interest in these matters. In fact, Rule 11 may have
sparked too much interest; complaints of uneven application and overuse
prompted the Advisory Committee (in what I regard as its finest hour in
recent memory) to listen to lawyers' complaints and respond with the
kinder, gentler Rule 11 now in effect.38 Perhaps the 1993 discloadvisory committee's note; Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 11-12 (describing the recent changes to Rule
16).
33. Continuing legal education, service on the rules committees, and interaction with the bar,
policymakers, and members of the public at large, are sufficiently important forms of public service
that the bench should be encouraged to pursue them even at the cost of some diversion from caserelated duties. But this tail of auxiliary activities should not wag the adjudicatory dog.
34. See Subrin, supra note 6, at 50.
35. See id. at 48-49.
36. See id. at 48.
37. See Stempel, Cultural Literacy, supra note 15, at 319-22.
38. Rule 11 ' 1983 Amendment empowered the courts to award expenses, including attorney's
fees, to a litigant whose opponent acts in bad faith. See Fed. R. Civ. P. II advisory committee's note,
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sure/discovery Amendments will have a similar impact, but I remain skeptical. However, Subrin's proposed consensus list of discovery groundrules
may make judges more willing to ride herd on the discovery fray by providing a ready template for deciding such disputes with a minimum of
pain and distraction.39
C. The Profession Has Fallen Under the Spell of Crisis
Rhetoric and a CorrespondingRush to Reform
Last year, I received a letter inviting me to the American Bar
Association's symposium called "Reaching Common Ground: A Summit
on Civil Justice Improvements."' In general, this is exactly the type of
event that should occur more often-assembling different segments of the
profession to discuss litigation reform.4 I am troubled, however, by the
apocalyptic tone of the invitation, which read like a direct mail fundraising
letter for a far right- or left-wing interest group. In much the same way
that political extremists talk vividly of a Rockefeller-Kissinger conspiracy
to control the world, or the ubiquitous influence of the military-industrial
complex, the ABA Letter labeled the current situation a "crisis" and identified a goal of the symposium as "launch[ing]
efforts to rescue our civil
42
justice system from its present crisis. 1
I am being a bit unfair, of course. The ABA only used the word "crisis" twice in the two-page letter. 3 Compare that to former Vice President
Dan Quayle's Council on Competitiveness which, in its Agenda for Civil
Justice Reform," suggested that the American litigation system was responsible for most problems of postindustrial society.45 Similarly, Congress fell prey to crisis rhetoric in enacting the Civil Justice Reform Act
of 1990 (Biden Bill),4 6 acting as if only a "drop-everything-and-focus-ondelay-reduction" approach could save the federal courts.47 The discourse

28 U.S.C. app. (Supp. 1 1983). The 1993 Amendments to Rule 11 place restrictions on the imposition
of sanctions by exempting discovery matters from the ambit of the Rule. See FED. R. CIv. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
39. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
40. Letter from R. William Ide III. ABA President, to Symposium Invitees (Nov. 19, 1993) (on
file with the author) [hereinafter Invite Letter].
41. The Common Ground program was held December 13-14, 1993, in Washington, D.C. and
contained an impressive roster of judges, practitioners, scholars, and policymakers.
42. See Invite Letter, supra note 40.
43. Id.
44. See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN

AMERICA (Aug. 1991).
45. Id.
46. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. V. 1993).
47. See generally Lauren K. Robel, The Politics of Crisis in the Federal Courts, 7 OHIO ST. J.
ON DIsP. RESOL. 115 (1992) (questioning the fundamental assumption that reducing delay and cost
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of litigation reform has become too feverish.
As others have noted, sound public policy seldom results from a
Chicken Little approach to changing the status quo.4 Although I am perhaps stretching the metaphor to describe the Civil Rules amendment process, a process which seems to require almost four years from the germ of
an idea to the effective date of Rules under the Enabling Act, I think the
analogy is apt. As Dreyfuss demonstrates, the forces favoring disclosure
pushed ahead in the face of substantial opposition, despite the conflict
between the proposed disclosure rules and the 1990 Biden Bill's edict that
each district experiment with delay and expense reduction.49 The
rulemakers seemed to accept as a given that alternatives to major Civil
Rules revision such as adding judges, enhancing court capacity through
improved technology or staffing, or modifying the Speedy Trial Act or the
Sentencing Guidelines to relieve the criminal pressure that squeezes the
federal civil docket, were nonstarters. In similar fashion, the rulemakers
summarily rejected as insufficient the bar's most popular alternative to
disclosure, a mandatory meet-and-confer rule forcing counsel to address
discovery matters early in the case." In my assessment, the rulemakers
failed to seriously consider less drastic alternatives because of the political
turf battling described by Dreyfuss52 and because the judiciary has been
brainwashed by the crisis mentality surrounding litigation issues. 3 During
the journey of the disclosure rules, the rulemakers acted as though only
fairly dramatic rules changes would do, despite the withering criticisms
directed at disclosure. 4

will provide increased access to justice).
48. See id. at 136-37.
49. See Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 10.
50. See id.
51. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f). The meet-and-confer rule, patterned after a variety of local rules.
was expressly or implicitly advocated by the ABA Litigation Section's Task Force on Discovery Reform, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, the Chicago Bar Association, other bar
associations, and lawyers.
52. See Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 24 (describing the judiciary's apparent view that it must maintain control of rulemaking and litigation reform efforts lest Congress step in).
53. Even absent the rhetoric of outsiders, the judiciary perhaps has a natural predisposition to see
litigation problems as larger than their actual girth because judges are on the front line of the system,
absorbing the annoyances of its imperfections on an unrelenting daily basis. See Lauren K. Robel,
Caseload and Judging: Judicial Adaptations to Caseload, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 3, 6 (finding that
survey research showed federal judges are disheartened by growing caseload pressures and feel unfairly overworked). The proposition that too little experience with the system may impede a rulemaker's
judgment seems readily accepted. See Statement of Justice White, in AMENDMENTS, supra note 18, at
501-06 (expressing concern over ability to assess proposed amendments due to long absence from
private practice). So, too, we should realize that persons too engrossed in the system's daily operational headaches may lack perspective regarding the overall seriousness of the shortcomings of the litigation system.
54. 1 should note that I am referring to the "rulemakers" as members of the Advisory Committee,
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D. The Profession, Particularlythe Judiciary,
Has Become Concerned That It Reform at a
Rapid Pace Lest It Lose Control
Over the Litigation System
This effort to preserve institutional jurisdiction55 is one of the most
understandable and defensible of the trends reflected in the story of the
1993 Amendments. For the most part, judicial primacy in rulemaking has
worked well in the fifty-plus years of the Enabling Act. The elite bench's
concern that it might be leapfrogged by another aggressive, Biden Bill-like
56
congressional effort to reform civil litigation is real, as the Biden Bill
and the Bush Administration's Quayle Repot 7 illustrate. Nonetheless, I
would prefer that judicial rulemakers show greater resistance toward the
political forces counseling a rush to judgment.
In the face of an onslaught of litigation reform proposals by partisan
and personally ambitious amateurs, the bench's desire to try to maintain a
hold on the process is quite admirable. It does not necessarily follow,
however, that the bench best accomplishes this by racing to implement a
watered down version of the oft-criticized disclosure system as a preemptive strike against the other branches of government. Perhaps the
public interest would have been better served if the rulemakers had adopted and defended a more restrained approach. Congress did make a restrained approach available throughout the Biden Bill's mandated experimentation and analysis by local courts."
Furthermore, the judiciary could have taken the initiative in attempting
to shape public debate, perhaps by at least standing up against the shallow
Quayle-like attacks on the system. If lawyers were to stand up to such
attacks, their obvious self-interest and scapegoat status would doom much

the Judicial Conference, and the Court as well as a few influential jurists who are not formally part of
these organizations. For example, Judge William Schwarzer, Director of the Federal Judicial Center, is
a rulemaker under my definition due to his stature and activism on the issue. Indeed, he and Magistrate Judge Wayne Brazil are the fathers of disclosure and were important to its adoption in the 1993
Amendments. See Subrin, supra note 6, at 37. This group of rulemaking insiders should be distinguished, however, from the bench at large. See Stempel, Cultural Literacy, supra note 15, at 322-24
(suggesting that discovery rulemaking experience shows continuing judicial difficulty in understanding
the effect of the adversary system and the legal profession in the implementation of rules). According
to informal conversations that I and other lawyers have had with judges, it has appeared to me
throughout the rulemaking process that the Advisory Committee's enthusiasm for disclosure was not
widely shared by the rank-and-file bench. The tendency of so many federal courts to opt out of disclosure seems to confirm that large segments of the judiciary have reservations about the 1993 Amendments.
55. See Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 24.
56. See supra note 13.
57. See supra note 44.
58. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-476 (Supp. V 1993).
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of the effort to ineffectiveness. If the bench took to the public a more
reflective view of litigation reform, the public and policymakers might listen. Chief Justice Burger's criticism of trial lawyer competence illustrates
the power of the bully judicial pulpit. It spawned increased emphasis on
trial practice and clinical education in law schools. The former Chief
Justice's promotion of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) was also instrumental in the success of the ADR movement. Unfortunately, much of
Chief Justice Burger's success came at the expense of lawyers (who he
painted as a large part of the problem) and public perception of the system
(which he seemed to portray as so bad that most litigants should readily
jump to ADR except in the most high-stakes constitutional cases).,9
In addition, as Subrin reminds us,' the rulemaking process was originally less dominated by the judiciary. Strong nonjudge Advisory Committee members, such as former Attorney General William Mitchell, and
Reporters, such as Yale Law Dean Charles Clark and Harvard Law Professors Albert Sacks and Benjamin Kaplan, provided many of the ideas and
modifications of earlier procedural reform efforts.6 In the rules revision
of the 1980s, particularly the disclosure amendments, the leading figures
on the Advisory Committee or influencing the Committee were judges.62
I would be the last person to suggest that a rulemaking product was presumptively problematic because of the influence of people like Judges
Wayne Brazil, William Schwarzer, Sam Pointer, or Ralph Winter. Just the
same, I would be more confident in the rulemaking product if practicing
lawyers and scholars had been more involved in generating the disclosure
proposal or evaluating and altering the proposal in the earlier stages of
consideration.
E. The Continuing Frontloadingof Litigation
The 1993 Amendments continue the increasing emphasis on early
activity in the processing of litigation in part because they continue in the
vein of case management. The 1993 Amendments add to the frontloading
of litigation activity by requiring that counsel swiftly meet and plan discovery and other litigation events.63 The presumptive deposition limit
also forces an earlier assessment of the case and its needed discovery and

59. See Stephen N. Subrin, Teaching Civil Procedure While You Watch It Disintegrate, 59
BROOK. L. REV. 1155, 1156-58 (1993) (viewing the 1976 Pound Conference orchestrated by Chief
Justice Burger as a kickoff of efforts to revise litigation but with prodefendant slant).
60. See Subrin, supra note 6, at 29-30.
61. See id. at 29, 34.
62. See Carl B. Rubin & Laura Ringenbach, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 137 F.R.D. 53, 54 (1991).
63. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
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proofs.' Additionally, lawyers will likely need to assess expert witness
contributions to the case earlier. Because of both Rule 11 and discovery/disclosure concerns, more lawyer time (which is not free, although
rulemakers and policymakers seem to forget to count such costs) must be
focused on the case before it is filed and during the first month or two of
the litigation.
At the risk of sounding like some politically incorrect proponent of
delay, I question whether faster and frontloaded is uniformly better. In my
own experience as a litigator and a law teacher, I find some extended
period of germination and ability to react to it useful in illuminating issues. Although advance planning is part of the analysis, it should not lock
lawyers into particular claims, arguments, or discovery strategies that later
prove misplaced. For litigants with fewer resources, the frontloading also
has a distributional effect. It makes litigation, even litigation that settles,
more expensive and perhaps less worth undertaking. Thus, the entities
most likely to be claimants may be particularly adversely affected.
Frontloading will make solo and small firms lawyers' practices more
difficult. With less litigation capacity, small firms will be hard pressed to
give each case a thorough, frontloaded workup during occasional "crunch"
periods or bottlenecks. Undoubtedly, many lawyers in both small and large
firms will do a poor job of grasping all aspects of the case at the outset.
Should their clients suffer because of the new litigation frontloading? Is
the system really benefitted if cases are disposed of with less time between complaint and resolution but where the resolution shifts in favor of
some parties? Is litigation really improved if cases settle faster but consume more legal expense or yield less defensible results?
The frontloading also reflects another problem with the 1993 Amendments noted by both Dreyfuss65 and Subrin. 6 According to the information available, in only a small proportion of cases67 are the parties and
counsel engaged in the sort of discovery war that prompted the rulemakers
to propose the disclosure rule. However, paradoxically, the disclosure
regime forces many lawyers to spend more on "average" or "typical"
litigation than they would have absent disclosure. To make things worse,

64.
65.
66.
67.

See
See
See
For

FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2).
Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 19.
Subrin, supra note 6, at 45-47.
example, most cases have no discovery events at all. Most of the rest have only a few

simple and discreet discovery events. See PAUL R. CONNOLLY ET AL., JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE

CIVIL LITIGATION PROCESS: DISCOVERY 36, 44 (1978) (concluding that comparatively few cases have
several discovery events or motions); TERRANCE DUNGWORTH & NICHOLAS PACE, STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 26-29 (1990) (reporting that 40% of cases ter-

minate without any court involvement and 35% terminate by motion); Early Endings, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. I1, 1994, at B5 (reporting that 44% of cases settle without completing pretrial discovery).
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disclosure is unlikely to change significantly in the problematic megacases. In such mega-cases, aggressive lawyers and high-stakes clients will
not hesitate to ask for court permission to do more; they will spend a lot
of money trying to get such permission and will probably succeed. Disclosure and presumptive deposition and interrogatory limits may prove to be
the metaphorical atom bomb used to eradicate the mosquito of excessive
or abusive discovery in a few cases.
F. PoliticalHorsetrading
Although many lawyers and judges say politics and law are quite
divorced, I think them inextricable. The question is not whether litigation
policy is political. It surely is political, just as the judiciary is a political
branch of our politically constituted government. The questions worth
debating are: "How do we prevent the system from becoming partisan?"
and "How do we control and supervise the resolution of political issues
inherent in litigation policy?" As I have suggested elsewhere," my preferred solution is to institutionalize consideration of the political issues
(e.g., whether a rule's change will favor defendants over plaintiffs, or
whether discrimination suits are more likely to be targeted under a new
rule) early in the rulemaking process by a diverse cross-section of the
legal profession and concerned parties such as litigants and interest groups.
The 1993 Amendments involved politics, but the wrong kind of politics. There was too little cross-sectional deliberation of the public interest
and too much brute positivism and pluralism. The proposed rules were
well-formed and the Advisory Committee aligned behind them well before
a significant sampling and consideration of professional opinion. In response, the practicing bar took a "this is all bad" and "you can't do this to
us" attitude. The rulemakers essentially responded by saying "oh, yes we
can" but then proposed a compromise.69
Many in the bar remained unsatisfied. The next significant political
move in this contest was lobbying Congress to abrogate the changes. More
politicking in response served to break down the interest groups sufficiently that the Senate failed to consider the House's bill which removed disclosure from the 1993 Amendments. Combined with the deadlines of the
Enabling Act, this failure served to save disclosure, presumptive limits, the
new Rule 11, and a provision allowing easier tape recording of depositions. As chronicled by Dreyfuss," this "Tolstoy Problem" of idiosyn-

68. See Stempel, Cultural Literacy, supra note 15, at 354-56; Stempel, New Paradigm, supra

note 18, at 737-59.
69. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
70. See Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 25.
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cratic unhappiness among the interested parties was not a pretty sight. It
was, of course, political and rather partisan. However, rulemaking and
litigation reform's inevitably political aspects can take place on a higher
plane, a point I develop more in Part IV of this article.
G. The Special Politics of Civil Rulemaking May Push
Toward a Form of Compromise Unrelated to the
Merits of Wise Civil Litigation Policy
In addition to the external politics affecting the 1993 amendment
process, a good deal of internal politics affected the process. Here, I use
the term "politics" to refer to the rulemakers' desire to accommodate
different facets of the legal profession and the legal policymaking community, not to partisan electioneering or questions of governmental role. As
Dreyfuss has noted, partisan jockeying for position was not far from the
surface of the rulemaking process. 7' For example, lawyers representing
manufacturers/product liability defendants were particularly well organized
in monitoring the development of disclosure and working against it before
both the Advisory Committee and Congress.' Issues of the government's
role also lurked in the background as the rulemakers worked to stave off
both congressional interference and the perception of inaction or unconcern regarding what the laity perceived as a litigation crisis.73
The politics to which I now refer are more in the nature of reciprocity
or logrolling among competing professional groups. For example, the
original proposed rules amendments established an unavoidable disclosure
regime for every case regardless of substance.74 In response to criticisms
leveled during the public comment period and hearing, the Advisory Committee modified the draft disclosure rule in 1992 so that disclosure regarding knowledgeable persons, their information, and documents would be
' Respondtriggered only when a claim was "alleged with particularity."75
ing to the concerns of the defense bar, particularly the product liability,

71. See id. at 10, 24-26.
72. This group even had an umbrella organization of sorts, Lawyers for Civil Justice, which also
represents these lawyer and client interests in other areas of tort reform policymaking. I should add
that I do not criticize this sort of interest group activity per se, even though the word "partisan" has a
generally negative connotation to many. I personally agreed with the position of the product liability
defense bar on disclosure, and was happy to act in de facto alliance with them. But while outright
interest group lobbying may be acceptable as a check on the process, my hope is that rulemaking becomes sufficiently inclusive and civically deliberative that lawyers will rarely mobilize against proposed rules changes. See infra part V.

73. See Dreyfuss, supra note 3,at 24.
74. See id. at 11-13.
75. See Randall Sambom, U.S. Civil Procedure Revisted: Committee Debates Further Amendments, NAT'L LJ., May 4, 1992, at 1.
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securities, and antitrust defense bar, the Advisory Committee sought to
make disclosure fairer by eliminating fishing expeditions for disclosure
through vague "hunch" pleading in cases characterized by great asymmetry of information between claimants and defendants. At the time, it
seemed like a decent compromise to me, even though I thought that nothing would make the disclosure dog hunt.
After reading the analyses of Dreyfuss, Subrin, and others,76 I now
see the essential contradiction in the Advisory Committee's proposed
compromise. Where the plaintiff can plead with particularity, the plaintiff
generally neither needs nor will profit by disclosure of the basic information. The plaintiff already possesses this information or it could not have
pleaded with particularity in the first place. The plaintiff may need some
discovery to tease out other incriminating facts or nail down its theory of
the case but this will ordinarily require pointed questioning through depositions or interrogatories. Defendants are hardly likely to serve these sort
of facts to plaintiffs on the silver platter of disclosure. Paradoxically, the
plaintiff who lacks the knowledge necessary to plead with particularity is
perhaps precisely the sort of litigant who would be substantially aided by
the basic disclosure envisioned by the 1993 Amendments.77
Thus, although well-intentioned, the particularity compromise seems
ill-suited to the mission of streamlining discovery and may even have the

76. See generally Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery-The Rush to Reform,
27 GA. L. REV. 1 (1992) (arguing that the new disclosure rules, adopted in haste without listening to
public comment, represented a radical and untested change to Rule 26); Thomas M. Mengler, Eliminating Abusive Discovery Through Disclosure: Is It Time Again for Reform?, 138 F.R.D. 155 (1991)
(asserting that initial disclosure requirements are not the solution to discovery problems).
77. In relatively simple cases, such as a workplace injury resulting in a claim against a manufacturer, e.g., where a worker who lost a hand in a punch press sues the manufacturer, the particularity
requirement is not hard to achieve, even for the unsophisticated and underinformed plaintiff. For example, alleging that "on the 14th of February, 1994 at 10 a.m., Plaintiff Smith's hand was crushed
while using the punch press at Acme Industries as Smith attempted to align a piece of metal on which
he was working" should suffice even to the courts that have taken Rule 9(b) most seriously. Obviously, when the dust has settled after disclosure/discovery/expert reports, etc.. the plaintiff will be asserting that the punch press should have had a guard rail to prevent Smith from placing his hand in the
machine or an automatic shutoff which is activated when hands and fingers are not clear of the machine.
However, this sort of case is not particularly improved by disclosure no matter how well executed. Defendants and plaintiffs will almost always get as much information during the first round of
discovery as is produced during disclosure and may often require discovery on top of disclosure to
clear up issues or avoid being deceived by the opposition. Under these circumstances, it is hard to discern what changes disclosure brings, other than more delay, cost escalation, and opportunity for mischief. In more complex cases, such as securities fraud, a pure, universal disclosure rule not only suffers from these failings but the "particularity paradox" is also at its zenith. Plaintiffs who do not need
disclosure will get it, while plaintiffs who could perhaps be aided by disclosure, but who are not particular enough, will not get it. Similarly, defendants are forced to spend extra time and money disclosing information to the knowledgeable, yet are permitted to take a less forthcoming approach toward
those who have less information.
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opposite effect. The possibility that rules changes may backfire, or that
law professors will predict their inefficacy, is nothing new. What is new is
the fairly self-conscious Advisory Committee's decision to attempt a political compromise in rulemaking, a compromise linked more to segmentation of opinion in the legal profession than to any logical construct. The
particularity requiremefit did not arise from any compelling policy argument. Rather, it arose as a means of attempting to level the playing field
between certain classes of litigants. Although I wholeheartedly endorse the
view that the rulemakers should routinely become apprised of all significant aspects of professional opinion on a rules matter, I have in mind
something quite different than a straight quid pro quo exchange. In effect,
a quid pro quo exchange is what the rulemakers accomplished: disclosure
remained in the 1993 Amendment package even though by late 1993 only
a few influential people in America seemed to like it. To sweeten the
bitter pill of automatic initial disclosure, the rulemakers proposed that
automatic disclosure would only be compelled in a subset of cases where,
according to the theory underlying Rule 9(b),78 the plaintiffs claims were
probably better than average, or at least nonfrivolous.79 The disclosure
rule the rulemakers originally proposed was mitigated, but to what gain
for either proponents or opponents? Like the proverbial camel resulting
when a committee tries to build a horse, the rulemakers' response to
pluralist pressures in the legal profession produced a new Rule 26(a) that
will neither win the Kentucky Derby nor navigate desert sands on minimal
food and water.
The local opt-out provisions of Rule 26(a), permitting each federal
district court to abrogate disclosure and presumptive interrogatory and
deposition limits,' strike me as the same sort of mutant by compromise.
However, this creature of inconsistency is hardly the fault of the
rulemakers. In passing the 1990 Biden Bill,8' Congress implicitly declared the 1990s to be a period of massive federal court experimentation
with procedures to curb delay and costs. Congress mandated that each district construct its own delay and expense reduction plan, providing that
each plan be studied and reported on to Congress.82 Much of the legal
profession 3 objected to the original version of the 1993 Amendments,
because it was premature to change the Federal Rules significantly before

78. See JAMES W. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 116 (1994) (observing that Rule 9(b)
requires that to successfully plead fraud or mistake, the pleader must state the circumstances which led
to the claim with particularity).
79. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26 advisory committee's note.
80. FED. R. CIv. P. 26 advisory committee's note.
81. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-472 (Supp. V 1993).
82. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 472-479 (Supp. V 1993).
83. This includes me as a representative of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York.
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the congressionally mandated experimentation and study had concluded.
Faced with this intractable logical inconsistency and heavy opposition
from the bar, and arguably Congress,84 the Advisory Committee could
have staged an orderly retreat, taken time to assess various local initiatives, and renewed the disclosure proposal at a later date. Instead, the
rulemakers again crafted a mutant compromise, rather than a hybrid compromise." They continued to advocate disclosure and presumptive limits,
yet they permitted federal district courts to exit or alter this supposedly
advanced litigation system at will. The result has been a crazy quilt of
discovery regimes in federal courts across the country. Some courts have
opted out completely, some have altered the Civil Rules regime, and some
have embraced the 1993 Amendments with varying degrees of enthusiasm.86 For example, New York City's four federal district courts have
dramatically different rules governing pretrial fact development, none of
which has been empirically tested or has proven efficacious. 7 The local
opt-out feature may have been a good political compromise for selling the
1993 Amendments to Congress in the face of strong adverse lobbying by
lawyers, but it is hardly sound litigation policy.
In addition, at least in my view, not all political compromises attending the 1993 Amendments were imbedded within Rule 26. Also included
in the package were substantial amendments to Rule 11." Although the
disclosure/discovery changes were generally unpopular with the bar, the
Rule 11 amendments generally enjoyed the bar's support.89 Not coincidentally, new Rule 11 is expected to lower the heated temperature of sanctions practice and to decreased the likelihood of sanctions on lawyers and
clients.' This is particularly important with substantial monetary awards

84. I say "arguably" because Congress has sent mixed messages: it passed the Biden Bill, 28
U.S.C. §§ 471-482, but appears to regard the judiciary as nonetheless not moving fast enough to
streamline civil litigation. See Stempel, Cultural Literacy, supra note 15, at 332-37.
85. The distinction I draw upon, and perhaps excessively torture, in the biological analogy is this:
a hybrid compromise is one which combines different approaches, theories, and rules and creates a
new compromise rule that has significant advantages in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, durability, or
some other attribute widely regarded as positive. By contrast, a mutation is usually a change in the
species that makes it less fit for its environment, often so much so that the mutant cannot survive for a
normal lifespan. Of course, biological mutations do not strictly result from compromise, as do hybrids,
but rather from intrinsic alterations in the life form. Nonetheless, I find the slightly twisted analogy apt
to emphasize a point-compromise does not necessarily yield a net improvement; it may produce an
unsuitable result.
86. See Cortese, supra note 13.
87. See Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 21.
88. See FED. R. Civ. P. I I advisory committee's note.
89. See Stempel, New Paradigm,supra note 18, at 675-83; Jeffrey W. Stempel, Sanctions, Symmetry, and Safe-Harbors: Limiting Misapplication of Rule 11 by Harmonizing It with Pre-Verdict
Dismissal Devices, 60 FORD. L. REV. 257, 259-62 (1991).

90. See Tobias, supra note 23, at 140.
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linked to the counsel fees of the successful Rule 11 movant.9 Because
certain elements of the bar and other interest groups wanted the new Rule
11 more than they feared the drawbacks of disclosure, they prevailed upon
at least one Senator to prevent a vote on the House bill to abrogate disclosure from the 1993 Amendments, as such a vote might have subjected
Rule 11 to congressional tinkering and possible strengthening. 92
In retrospect, coupling new Rule 11 with new Rules 26-37 suggests
superb planning by those who might define politics as the art of the possible or the science of compromise. Whether this was intended is difficult to
discern. I am not sure that disclosure supporters can be given credit for the
"tying arrangement" that helped the disclosure provisions take effect. Rule
11 and the disclosure rules had such different origins and took such different paths in development that one cannot be sure the rulemakers knew that
political palatability of the 1993 Amendment package would be more than
the sum of its parts. Nevertheless, the 1993 Amendments illustrate the
power and possible perverse effects of aggregating proposed amendments
involving quite disparate aspects of the civil rules. A combined Civil
Rules package may be undefeatable even though none of its significant
component parts enjoys widespread favor or could have stood alone.
Arrow's Theorem comes to civil rulemaking. 93 At a minimum, the episode suggests that perhaps the rulemakers should reflect more 'seriously
and openly about whether they will present Civil Rules amendments in
isolation or in combination and why.
HI. SUBRIN'S SUBSTANCE-SPECIFIC PROCEDURE:
A POTENTIAL WAY OUT OF THE MAZE
I generally agree with those who have criticized the past fifteen years
as a time of excessive tinkering with the Civil Rules, but I do not advocate abolition of the Advisory Committee's permanent status.' 4 Generally,
I favor making litigation simpler rather than more complex, and regard the
litigation process as simpler with fewer rules governing the process. Nonetheless, I find Subrin's proposal exciting. Bench and bar should explore
the proposal through serious and sustained experimentation with it. I say

91. See Dissenting Statement of Justice Scalia, supra note 18, at 507 (asserting that changes in
Rule II will render it "toothless" in discouraging litigation abuse); FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1993 AMENDMENTS, A PRACTICAL GUIDE 10- 11, 69 (Gregory K. Arenson & Robert F. Wise
eds., 1994).
92. See Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 25-26.
93. Arrow's Theorem, derived from the work of economist Kenneth Arrow, posits that the manner in which votes are taken may result in political outcomes that do not reflect the complete support
for, or opposition to, the policy eventually adopted. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY,
LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 38-62 (1991).

94. See supra note 23.
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this although, as detailed more fully below, I have some criticisms of
aspects of Subrin's sales pitch for substance-specific procedure. In addition, properly attempting Subrin's thesis will require a massive professional commitment of time and sustained interest, as well as experimentation
in the real world. Yet, the requisite investment in attaining selective substance-specific procedure should not deter the legal profession from exploring the procedure. If Subrin's thesis is correct, and after substantial
initial skepticism I now believe that it is, the legal system's frontloaded
investment in developing and testing presumptive discovery entitlements
and limits will pay dividends for decades to come.
A. Confessions of a Recalcitrant Transubstantivist
When the late Robert Cover brought a rethinking of universal or
"transubstantive" civil procedure to the forefront more than fifteen years
ago,95 the possibility of departing from Judge Charles Clark's "one size
fits all" model immediately achieved currency in the academic community
although the model seemed too dramatic for policymakers to seriously
consider.96 Thus, despite the frequent rulemaking activity of the 1980s
and 1990s, there appears to have been no formal consideration of departing from the norm of transubstantivity and, instead, addressing some litigation matters with substance-specific procedure. In the legal academy,
support for substance-specific procedure appears to have increased,' de-

95. See Robert M. Cover, For James Win. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules,
84 YALE L.J. 718, 732-33 (1975). Professor Cover spoke of "trans-substantive" rules, id., while Subrin
spells out the genre as "transubstantive" rules. See Subrin, supra note 6, at 50. I have adopted Subrin's
spelling because this portion of my article focuses on his paper, because I generally prefer to avoid
hyphenating words, and because speaking of "non-trans-substantive" procedure is particularly awkward. "General" or "universal" procedure are perhaps better labels than "transubstantive." Without
question, it is easier to refer to "substance-specific" procedure rather than "non-transubstantive" procedure.
96. See Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An
Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067,
2068 (1989). Professor Carrington notes that Cover's
vision has been echoed by other skeptics in the years since his writing, but it has never
been "tran-substantiated" as a draft of procedure rules that might be considered as an alternative to the "trans-substantive" rules sometimes decried. It has survived as a ghost in
the darkness surrounding academic discussions of the future of civil procedure.
id. (citations omitted).
97. See Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and
Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 696-97 (1988); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 494, 547-48 (1986); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity
Conquered Common Law: The FederalRules of Civil Procedurein HistoricalPerspective, 135 U. PA.
L. REV. 909, 985 (1987).
These three sources are noted by Carrington, supra note 96, at 2068 n.4, regarding the popularity of the substance-specific concept in academic circles. However, Carrington implies that, at least
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spite the absence of any particularly concrete proposals for departing from
the transubstantive ideal.
Until now, I have been part of the academic group resistant to substance-specific procedure. The lure of the transubstantive model, to me at
least, is obvious: it tends to make for a leaner set of procedural rules more
attuned philosophically to a common law system of adversarial adjudication. For the past fifty years, the prevailing conventional wisdom has

posited that attempting to codify civil procedure according to the type of
lawsuit at issue leads to a massive civil code, one that is both more complex and more likely to be inapt for the particular disputes that will later
come before the court. Because I now have sufficient doubt about this
conventional wisdom, Subrin's proposal strikes me as a particularly apt
experiment for testing an alternative approach.
Part of my attraction to Subrin's idea stems from the shortcomings of
the current status quo of transubstantivity. Application of the model over
time has shown that a transubstantive code of civil procedure is no guarantee of either simplicity or equitable results in particular cases.

Regarding simplicity, we have seen the Civil Rules change and expand, particularly in the past thirty years: the 1966 class action98 and
pleading amendments,99 the 1970 changes broadening discovery,"o the
1980 changes attempting to nudge counsel toward a more streamlined and
cooperative approach to discovery,'' the 1983 Rule 11 amendment,"°2
by 1989, the notion of substance-specific procedure had run out of steam among law school faculty, as
well as failed to influence rulemakers. Id. Subrin's renewal of the proposal, see Subrin, supra note 6,
at 55, and the discussion engendered at the 1994 AALS Meeting, see supra note 2, suggest to me that
a large portion of law faculty teaching procedure or civil litigation remain attracted to greater substance specificity in procedure.
98. See JOHN J. COUND ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES AND MATERIALS 657-58 (6th ed.
1993); Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 386 (1967) (describing the history and problems
associated with the prior class action rule, and the 1966 changes).
99. See Kaplan, supra note 98, at 410 (discussing problems of the pre-1966 rule on amendment
and relation back of pleadings, particularly where the initial party was misnamed, as illustrated in the
case of Martz v. Miller Bros. Co., 244 F. Supp. 246 (D.Del. 1965). where plaintiff's claim was lost
due to naming the "wrong" Miller Brothers Department Store, with no decision on the merits). See
generally Robert D. Brussack, Outrageous Fortune: The Case for Amending Rule 15(c) Again, 61 S.
CAL. L. REv. 671 (1988) (discussing the need for revising Rule 15(c)); Harold S.Lewis, Jr., The Excessive History of FederalRule 15(c) and Its Lessonsfor Civil Rules Revision, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1507
(1987) (describing continuing problems regarding change of parties and relation back).
100. See 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 2003, at 22 (1970) (noting that the "1970 amendments made significant changes of substance in the
discovery rules"); FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 5.11 (3d
ed. 1985) (focusing on 1970 revisions regarding trial preparation materials and discovery of expert
witness information).
101. See FED. R, Civ. P. 26(g) advisory committee's note (establishing discovery conference procedure under Rule 26(0); FED. R. Civ. P. 37(g) advisory committee's note (regarding sanctions for
failure to "participate in good faith in the framing of a discovery plan by agreement as is required by
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1991's revision of Rule 15(c) to overturn a problematic Supreme Court
decision,"°3 the massive 1993 changes," 4 and numerous technical
changes as well. If the Judicial Conference had not intervened and deleted
a proposed revision of Rule 56 from the 1993 package of amendments, we
might now have a rule regarding summary judgment that scripted the
conduct of counsel regarding the form of their motion papers in a manner
akin to what lawyers are increasingly encountering through local rules and
standing orders. Although one can argue that such micromanagement of
lawyering by national rule is a good thing,"°5 it certainly does not promote a lean, minimalist code. Rulemakers are willing to consider such
proposals, to actually enact involved schemes like initial disclosure and
planning meetings, and to describe in detail what must be contained in an
expert witness report. Given the already long and complex Civil Rules, a
desire for simplicity alone should not act as a bar to allowing rulemakers
and others to seriously consider substance-specific procedure.
The long-presumed efficacy, flexibility, and fairness associated with
transubstantive procedure have recently come into question. We now have
substantial grounds for doubting the notion that broad and uniform rules
achieve acceptable results by freeing judges to craft optimal solutions to
emerging problems. Indeed, much of the history of the most recent generation of Civil Rules revisions has involved efforts to amend the Rules to
foreclose erroneous or harsh judicial interpretations of the Rules' broad
transubstantive language. For example, Rule 15 regarding misnamed par-

Rule 26(f)" under Rule 37(g)).
Justice Powell dissented from the 1980 discovery changes because he regarded them as mere
tinkering that did not address the root causes of perceived discovery abuse. Amendments to Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 997, 997-1001 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting). He appears prophetic
in that rulemakers returned to this area of the Civil Rules only a decade later by proposing the more
sweeping 1993 Amendments. However, the experience of the 1980 Discovery Conference Amendments suggest that transubstantively and abstractly urging, or even commanding, lawyers to make
discovery work better is unlikely to bring dramatic results.
102. See GEORGENE VAIRO, RULE 11 SANCTIONS §§ 1.01, .07, 2.04 (1991); Stephen B. Burbank,
The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925,
passim (1989) (describing shift to 1983 version of Rule 11).
103. See Benjamin Kaplan, Comment on Carrington, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2125, 2128 (1989) (referring to Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21 (1986), which prompted the 1991 amendment, as a
"monstrous" decision misreading Rule 15(c)).
104. See Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 10-11.
105. The argument, as I understand it, holds that too many lawyers will, if left to their own devices, fail to adequately display the summary judgment issues for judicial resolution. Although this may
be true, I disagree that it requires a national rule change or even regulation by local rule or standing
order. Judges who find motion papers too cumbersome or indecipherable should address the issue at
the oral motion hearing and, if necessary, rule adversely to the party whose counsel has failed to present the issue properly for decision. A fixed rule scripting motion papers is overkill. Counsel should
generally be allowed to make motions, summary judgment or otherwise, in the manner seen as most
persuasive.
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ties and relation back has twice been revisited for this purpose because the
revised Rule was either unclear or did not anticipate possible unfairness." Rule 11 was transubstantively changed in 1983 to make it a
tougher tool against frivolous litigation. Because Rule 11 proved too
tough, the rulemakers substantially revised it in 1993.
The major academic defense of transubstantivity advances several
axioms that Subrin and I seem to regard as completely incorrect. The first
axiom is that the flexibility of transubstantive rules is preferable because it
frees judges to act flexibly, fairly, and correctly. 7 The second fallacious
axiom is that transubstantive rulemaking is, by definition, politically neutral while substance-specific rulemaking is less neutral.0 8 This view concludes that substance-specific rulemaking invites judicial rulemakers to be
less neutral and invades the proper authority of Congress."° The third
axiom is that judges, despite having a "stake" in the rules and political
preferences of their own, are "not advancing personal agendas" when
acting as rulemakers."' The fourth axiom supporting transubstantive
rules is that more particularized substance-specific procedure will make
rulemaking more vulnerable to interest group politics.''
The events of the past twenty-five years and the current and historical
data described by Dreyfuss"' and Subrin refute these contentions at
length."' The assumed saintliness of judges is but a fudge point, the
weakness of which I discuss further below." 4 Judges, like practicing
lawyers, are vulnerable to personal interest. Transubstantive rulemaking
has resulted in both unwise judicial application of the Civil Rules and
today's hotly politicized interest group model of rulemaking. Despite its
transubstantivity, the current rulemaking regime seems to have triggered
congressional concern on both policy and democracy grounds. In short,
general procedure appears to suffer the same failing that critics usually
attribute to substance-specific procedure. In addition, the tendency of
broad general rulemaking to disguise political and distributional issues of
procedure strikes me as a greater failing. With substance-specific procedure, the politics of rulemaking may be more open and, therefore, less
106. See authority cited supra notes 99, 103.
107. See Carrington, supra note 96, at 2081-85. 108. See id. at 2074-76, 2085-87 (former Civil Rules Advisory Committee Reporter of longest
tenure argues that transubstantive rules are less likely to have political impact).
109. Id.
110. See id. at 2077.
111. See id. at 2085; Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: MandatoryInformal Discovery
and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REv. 795, 835-42 (1991) (suggesting that the promulgation
of substance-specific rules is politicized because it necessitates input from interested parties).
112. See Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at part II.
113. See Subrin, supra note 6, at part Ill
114. See infra text accompanying notes 115-20.
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problematic."'
Furthermore, the increasing politicization of the federal bench has
undermined the transubstantive model. As Subrin's historical scholarship
demonstrates, Charles Clark and the other "fathers" of the 1938 Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure assumed vastly unrealistic talents of federal
judges. They were thought to be omnicompetent, steadfastly neutral,
enduringly patient, and wise. 16 This deified view of judges was more
than a mere "fudge point" in the original rulemakers' plans for discovery
practice; the view was a gaping blind spot that pervaded the entire structure of the Civil Rules. The original rulemakers overestimated judges'
ability to efficiently control discovery, to shape litigation in the face of
notice pleading, to appreciate the fine distinctions between a weak case
and one deserving summary disposition, and to control errant lawyers and
juries.
This blind spot is particularly inconsistent with the original Advisory
Committee's notion that juries were barely to be trusted and lawyers not at
all. To state the obvious but often overlooked: judges are human beings
and, perhaps worse yet, former lawyers. It is hard to imagine that the
selection process for federal district judges has become so refined that
those attaining the bench are free of negative traits normally afflicting
humanity and the legal profession. If anything, the situation has worsened
over the past fifty years and made the original rulemakers' fudge point
even less tenable. Once a crowning jewel capping a distinguished career,
many view appointment to the bench as an unattractive job offering poor
working conditions and inadequate compensation. " '
In addition, the confirmation process has become more politicized both
in terms of the "vetting""' of nominees, a practice that may discourage
some candidates, and the more conscious consideration of their political

115. Furthermore, Subrin's proposal of substance-specific discovery procedure seems quite different from the procedure envisioned and attacked by Carrington, supra note 96, who argued that a summary judgment rule should be transubstantive. Carrington may be correct in arguing that the standard
for determining whether a claim has factual or legal support must be broad and general to be sufficiently fair and flexible. See Carrington, supra note 96, at 2099. But these arguments seem less persuasive regarding discovery, an area of civil litigation where recurring issues of fair access to information arise that are often largely divorced from the merits of particular cases.
116. See Subrin, supra note 6, at 35.
117. See Lauren K. Robel, Caseload and Judging: JudicialAdaptations to Caseload, 1990 B.Y.U.
L. REv. 3, 38-41 (detailing federal judges' high degree of job dissatisfaction).
118. See WEBSTER'S NEW NINTH COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1312 (1988). The dictionary definition, after the preferred definition providing medical or veterinary care, is "to subject a (person or animal) to a physical examination or checkup" or "to subject to expert appraisal or correction: EVALUATE." Id. Examples of the phenomenon in modem politics include the well-publicized situations of
Attorney General nominee Zoe Baird (opposed because of irregularities in her child care arrangements)
and United States District Judge Kimba Wood (dropped from consideration for nomination to the
Supreme Court based on her concededly legal child care arrangements).
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orientation. In my view, there was something of a "Reagan Revolution" in
judicial selection as well as fiscal policy." 9 In the Nixon Administration,
the Executive Branch was expressly committed to nominating a more
politically conservative, "strict constructionist" type of judge. However,
continued deference to Senators and other important local politicians
meant that Nixon-Ford appointees did not look much different from Eisenhower or Kennedy-Johnson appointees.
The Carter Administration expressly endorsed a merit selection process
although many Democrats argued that merit selection resulted in too many
Republican appointees by a Democratic president. The Reagan Justice
Department took a more aggressive approach to nominating only judicial
candidates espousing the President's own conservative judicial philosophy.
The Reagan Administration was willing to jettison senatorial courtesy if
necessary to maintain this approach.
As the well-publicized battles over the nominations of Robert Bork
and Clarence Thomas reveal, much of the Reagan-Bush policy was contested, especially in high profile appointments. Overall, the 1980-92 period
produced a more conservative breed of federal judge than prior periods.
Although the Clinton Administration has made few judicial appointments,
it appears that Clinton is opting to return to centrist-liberal appointees.
How do the politics of federal bench appointments relate to civil discovery procedure? In my view, today's more politically polarized federal
bench means more extreme and less consistent judicial responses to discovery matters. My working hypothesis is that Republican and Democratic
appointees will often differ substantially in their views of the general
worth of lawsuits alleging discrimination, securities fraud, or claims of
product defect. Their general view of such suits will accordingly affect
their decisions on discovery motions attending such litigation. A Carter or
Clinton appointee might be willing to permit a discrimination plaintiff
more than the presumptive twenty-five interrogatories or ten depositions.
A Reagan-Bush appointee, however, will deny the request for more discovery to facilitate summary judgment, secretly thinking that the case is
worth only two depositions. Similarly, liberals and conservatives will
undoubtedly diverge about what constitutes relevance to disputed facts for
purposes of policing compliance with the new disclosure provisions of
Rule 26(a).
As lawyers and citizens, we can debate vigorously as to which
perspective is correct for each type of claim. It seems to me, however, that
there is no debate on one key point: the current litigation process seems
119. Although, to be sure, judicial nominees before 1981 were also probably selected on factors
other than pure merit, such as personal friendship with influential politicians. See HAROLD W. CHASE,
FEDERAL JUDGES: THE APPOINTING PROCESS 26-34 (1972).
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characterized by de facto substance-specific procedure operating under a
smokescreen of transubstantively written Civil Rules. Because the
transubstantive ideal no longer seems to exist in reality (assuming it ever
did), I advocate at least experimenting with substance-specific procedure.
Because of the increasing variety and complexity of law and the decreasing cohesiveness of judicial views regarding particular claims, I am prepared to accept the idea that a transubstantive procedural code fails to
sufficiently guide judges and constrain judicial discretion.
Experimenting with substance-specific procedure will not resolve
problems stemming from the length and complexity of the Civil Rules.
Because Subrin's suggested standards would not be codified in the Civil
Rules until universally accepted, the standards would not pad the already
thickening Rules until viewed as an improvement upon the current system.
Although non-Rules directives like local rules, standing orders, and
Subrin's suggested substance-specific discovery standards place more
pressure on lawyers and judges, there are now serious questions as to
whether Subrin's suggested new directives and standards will materially
increase the overall gird of the procedural rules game. The creeping
growth of transubstantive rules like disclosure, rules that increase the
burdens on counsel and clients but are predicted not to achieve offsetting
benefits,t 21 persuade me to suggest that introducing case-specific discovery guidelines may make civil discovery less complex, less erratic, and
easier to administer.
B. The Advantages of Subrin's Approach
Subrin's proposals present a number of advantages to the status quo
foreshadowed in the previous discussion and discussed in Subrin's article.
Because the current omnibus Civil Rules have already departed from the
original expectations of the 1938 rulemakers, the introduction of more
concrete standards will not create any great detriment of confusion and
may reduce confusion by providing more guidance. The notion of substance-specific discovery guidelines also responds directly to my perceived
inconsistent politicization of the litigation process; substance-specific discovery guidelines will decrease such politicization.
Subrin's proposal suggests that we move the phenomenon of judicial
division over the discovery worth of different types of claims outside the
subterranean reaches of the often unreported caselaw and engage in widespread discussion of what constitutes presumptively appropriate discovery
in discrimination cases, product liability cases, antitrust cases, securities
cases, and so on. His vision assumes that a common ground of consensus
120. See Subrin, supra note 6, at 44.
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exists upon which the diverse perspectives of the profession could coalesce. Subrin envisions codification of this common ground to limit extreme and probably unfair exercises of discretion by the more extreme
ranks of the judiciary.
It is important to emphasize that Subrin's proposal, at least as I understand it, would operate not only as a set of presumptive limits on discovery in certain cases, but would also create a set of presumptive discovery
entitlements for claimants and others seeking information to support their
claims. 2' Consequently, Subrin's proposal has the potential intellectual
merit and political feasibility of becoming a set of discovery guidelines.
The guidelines would be both fair and perceived as fair for plaintiffs and
defendants. Furthermore, the concrete set of standards envisioned by
Subrin would not only guide district judges in policing discovery but
would also provide a yardstick for appellate courts to apply in reviewing
trial court discovery decisions.
It is possible that no such consensus is attainable. Nonetheless, the
legal profession should at least attempt consensus. If after serious effort
the divisions in discovery viewpoint remain too great, the profession, and
society, face at least two possible choices for resolving the matter. We can
either continue the current status quo characterized by ad hoc resolution of
discovery disputes regardless of subject matter or we can make some hard
political choices and legislate specific discovery groundrules according to
type of case, even if such legislation would infuriate the losers in the
battle. Because either of these "solutions" has obvious drawbacks, Subrin's
proposal is worth a serious try.
Consider maintaining the status quo. It would not be such a bad path
if, in fact, judges seriously focused on discovery matters in the cases before them, decided them in thorough, written opinions, published these
opinions, and saw rigorous appellate review of the opinions. In time, a
common law of discovery by case type would emerge and commentators
could collect and assess the common law. This has happened to a degree,
but, for the most part, judges do not take discovery disputes as seriously
as they should."n Judges seldom write detailed opinions, publish discovery rulings infrequently, and rarely have their discovery decisions reviewed." Consequently, the current common law of discovery is com-

121. To the extent I have a major quibble with Subrin's presentation and defense of his idea, it is
this: he emphasizes too greatly the degree to which substance-specific guidelines will limit discovery.
In many cases it will expand discovery. Just as many defendants may be "blackmailed" into excessive
discovery, many plaintiffs are successfully "stonewalled" by obstructionist defense counsel and
prodefendant judges.
122. See Stempel, Cultural Literacy, supra note 15, at 345-52.
123. Under the final order doctrine, appellate review ordinarily occurs only if the case has been
completely adjudicated on the merits. Where litigation settles, there is obviously no appeal, even of
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posed of local custom, common sense, and the grapevine. None of these
methods for determining whether to press a discovery position is necessarily bad, but they do not lead to the type of precedential certainty that
makes for efficient litigation. Historical judicial reluctance to invoke Rule
37 sanction powers against abusive discovery seekers and resisters also
prevents precedential certainty.
In short, maintaining the status quo seems likely to perpetuate the
current discovery situation that so many view as unsatisfactory. Uncertainty, individual judicial differentiation, and opportunity for lawyers' strategic
behavior are byproducts of the current discovery situation. As
Dreyfuss,'2 4 Subrin, ' -5 and others have demonstrated, the 1993 Amendments are unlikely to eliminate these byproducts and may exacerbate them
by giving counsel new general rules to invoke, ignore, or haggle over
before disinterested judges. For this reason, maintaining the present system
might prove acceptable to lawyers so long as views of a discovery crisis
do not escalate sufficiently to result in more sweeping legal reforms that,
for example, would eliminate certain claims or cap counsel fees.
For example, one lawyer's reaction to Subrin's proposal was to view it
as too difficult to achieve; the lawyer saw the status quo as acceptable. If
one judge ruled adversely in Case A, the next judge might rule favorably
in Case B. Over the long haul, this lawyer saw the current situation as
better than the possibility of a rule or guideline limiting discovery in all
cases. At least under the status quo, the lawyer was prevailing fifty per12 6cent of the time.
On one level, this lawyer's reaction is colorable: an inconsistent half
loaf is better than no loaf (if one assumes that a rule of none is the incorrect rule). On another level, the reaction is pure self-interest. Lawyers and
other repeat players (such as insurers, manufacturers, and brokers) can
average out gains and losses over time." 7 However, many litigants have
only one litigation experience in their lives and will almost certainly have
only one case on a particular claim. Thus, a legal system that bats .500 on
their discovery rights is nothing to brag about. 28 Despite some difficulty

bizarrely incorrect discovery rulings. In the few cases eligible for appeal, the reviewing court is unlikely to scrutinize discovery rulings unless quite convinced that the discovery ruling affected the outcome
of the case. Although discovery is sometimes reviewed under exceptions to the final order rule, such
as the collateral order doctrine or a petition for a writ of mandamus, this is unusual. See DAVID F.
HERR ET AL., MOTION PRACTICE § 25.9, at 590 (1985).

124. See Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at part II.
125. See Subrin, supra note 6, at 55-56.
126. Interview with commercial litigator, Jan. 28, 1994 (who requested anonymity in the recounting of this conversation).
127. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & SOc'y REV. 95, 97 (1974).

128. Of course, batting .500 on discovery is not as bad as batting .500 on substantive outcomes.
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in comparison because of individual case variance, the legal system should
aspire to give each litigant in every case a reasonable amount of discovery
opportunity or discovery protection. Consequently, a finely tuned set of
presumptive discovery entitlements and limitations could provide more
equalized procedural justice.
On this point, however, I have a relatively minor objection to the way
in which Subrin has packaged his plan for sale. He trumpets substancespecific discovery guidelines as a means for making life easier for lawyers
and judges'29 but says relatively little about what litigants might gain or
lose. For example, Subrin sees his plan as giving a big efficiency boost to
contingent fee lawyers, stating that they "should embrace the idea of preannounced procedures geared to some types of cases because such procedures should reduce time, delay, and costs for the lawyers and their cli, 30
ents."
However, the contingent counsel's interests are not always so congruent with the client or prospective client's interests. A plaintiff's product
liability lawyer might like practicing under poorly calibrated but clearer
discovery guidelines even if this forces the lawyer to turn away some
difficult cases, settle cases more cheaply, or lose cases at trial. The lawyer
can average things out over time and reduce the number of meritorious but
unprofitable cases taken. By contrast, the unsuccessful, undercompensated,
or rejected client is considerably less fortunate. Consequently, litigants will
embrace substance-specific discovery guidelines only if they are essentially fair as well as clear and easy to apply.
This rationale holds for defendants as well as plaintiffs. For example,
a defendant required to produce truckloads of barely marginal documents
under Subrin's guidelines will know what is expected, and as a result, may
pay more settlement ransom to avoid this exercise. However, the defendant might prefer the status quo. If Subrin's discovery scheme is to be
worthwhile, his proposed guidelines must "get it right" at least as often as
judges do in ad hoe cases.
The catch, of course, is that it might prove very difficult to achieve
any consensus as to the proper scope and limitations of substance-specific
discovery under Subrin's plan. If such consensus proves unattainable, the
second obvious solution-letting the politically stronger coalition impose

Many errors regarding discovery will not affect the substantive outcome of the case, and may not even
affect its settlement value. Most such errors probably do redound, however, to the real detriment of the
party that should win the discovery dispute. At a minimum, some nontrivial, "wasted" litigation expense is almost certainly involved in every case of discovery error.
129. Subrin, supra note 6, at 56. Commenting on a prior draft of this article, Subrin emphasized
that he does indeed see his proposal as benefitting litigants as well as lawyers and that my criticism
probably stems from a presentation problem (his) or an interpretation problem (mine).
130. Id. at 47.
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its will on the others-looms as a possibility. Many in the profession will
shrink from this solution because it implies that legal rules are the product
of political choice rather than substantive rationality. However, as detailed
in Dreyfuss" 3 and Subrin's 32 articles, litigation today has an inescapable element of political choice. The "wise men" model of rulemaking
under the Enabling Act provides the impression that rules are made by
impartial reflection. 33 This is only a veneer because rules are really a
culmination of many value choices. Congress implicitly acknowledged this
when it passed 1988 Amendments to the Enabling Act mandating more
openness in the rulemaking process. Although rulemaking should never
take on the overtly partisan tones of a political convention, rulemaking
should consider and debate differing views of the litigation system to
adequately respond to the diverse interests new rules will affect.
One strength of Subrin's proposal, a strength I extrapolate upon below, is that the proposal encourages real dialogue and reflection among
different facets of the national legal community. Even if the standards
Subrin envisions result from a divisive political struggle dominated by
some factions of the litigation community,"u the standards might still
significantly improve the status quo. The process might even benefit the
losers of the political struggle by forcing open political debate and
decisionmaking.
The advantages of Subrin's proposal become apparent when one optimistically makes the inferential leap that his proposal could be
operationalized with a set of presumptive discovery entitlements and limits
for all major types of cases that now trigger significant discovery disputes.
Subrin's proposal gives judges a useful template for deciding such disputes efficiently. It encourages consistency and allows easier enforcement
by appellate review. His proposal offers guidance to lawyers and clients
and may encourage agreement or avoidance of the fruitless discovery fight
131. See Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 26.
132. See Subrin, supra note 6, at 27-28.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 116-17.
134. Of course, the term "community" has become somewhat of a buzzword in the 1990s. In my
opinion, this term is invoked too frequently. It too often is used to connote an assemblage of
decisionmakers who happen to agree with the author, thereby invoking the nostalgic image of a cohesive community. See Linda S.Mullenix, Mass Tort as Public Law Litigation:Paradigm Misplaced, 88
Nw. U. L. REV. 579, 584-85 (1994) ("Communitarianism is a frightening ethical system because one
person's community is another person's exclusion.").
Despite the debasing of the term and controversy surrounding it,
I think it apt for describing
those who administer, frequently participate in, or have serious interests in American civil litigation.
There is a community of lawyers, repeat clients, interest groups, and politicians who regard litigation
as important, and try to shape and reform it toward what they regard as improvement. This community
is far from cohesive; among others it includes ATLA, Lawyers for Civil Justice, Public Citizen, Aetna,
Dan Quayle, Senator Joe Biden, and the variegated views of the Supreme Court. But it is quite an
identifiable community in that it is a "litigation village" in which civil litigation policy is made.
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far better than the disclosure regime under the newly amended Civil Rules.
Counsel can debate concepts like relevance at length. However, when
faced with fixed limits on access to witnesses and documents in a product
liability case, counsel's freedom to debate is limited. Unless armed with
compelling arguments, the lawyers must accept the concrete guidelines
Subrin envisions and move on with the case. Where they fail to do so,
judges will have a clearer yardstick for determining the propriety and
amount of sanctions necessary. Under Subrin's guidelines, judges should
be able to better police discovery misbehavior without slipping into the
potential excessive deterrence many observers associate with the 1983-93
version of Rule 11.
Indeed, as Subrin himself suggests, the main attraction of his proposal
is that it could move litigation reform, and the judges who administer the
system, away from case management and toward making decisions.'35 By
temperament, training, and skill, the bench is better equipped to decide
discovery and nondiscovery legal issues than to administer lawyer and
litigant behavior. Although some rudimentary case management is required
of the system, *the movement has, in my view, passed the point of diminishing returns. The 1993 Amendments illustrate this failing clearly. Instead
of clarifying discovery rights and responsibilities via new standards or
swifter decisionmaking, the bench-led drive has produced a disclosure
system that essentially asks lawyers to work things out faster, cheaper, and
with less acrimony. In light of the adversarial structure of American civil
litigation and the duties and economic incentives of lawyers and clients,
the disclosure solution alone is no solution. 13 By contrast, Subrin's proposal shifts the focus from mere edicts hoping for better lawyer behavior
to a set of more concrete standards which direct greater judicial attention
to policing discovery disputes rather than to merely wishing them away.
C. OperationalizingSubstance-Specific Discovery
The means of working toward Subrin's proposed Eden are, I think,
considerably less complicated than the actual task of crafting his presumptive guidelines. An established and respected legal organization should be
the first to attempt implementing Subrin's proposal. This suggestion narrows the field considerably. Obvious candidates are the Judicial Conference of the United States, the American Law Institute (ALI), the American
Bar Association (ABA), 137 substantial state and local bar

135. See Subrin, supra note 6, at 50.
136. See Stempel, Cultural Literacy, supra note 15, at 324-28 (describing incentives for both attorneys and litigants to test the limits of rules in order to prevail in disputes).
137. The American College of Trial Lawyers might be such an organization as well, but its small-
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associations,'38 specialized bar associations (for certain classes of cases), 39 or a consortium of special interest professional organizations."4
Of these organizations, the ABA seems best positioned to experiment with
Subrin's proposal, preferably through a special subcommittee or task force
of its Litigation Section Trial Practice Committee.
The Judicial Conference has been in the rulemaking business for more
than fifty years and, despite well-taken criticisms to some of its more
recent work, has not done badly. However, the history of the 1993
Amendments as told by Dreyfuss 4 ' and others leaves me with the firm
conviction that someone else needs to take a hard look at discovery reform. In particular, the group that takes on substance-specific discovery
must solicit a wider array of opinion from practicing lawyers and clients
of all stripes, not merely from the elite lawyers and firms. The Judicial
Conference simply does not have a particularly good track record of tapping mass opinion. This problem is particularly acute in the discovery
context considering the bench's long record of treating it as the poor stepchild of litigation issues. The forlorn search for the magic bullet of disclosure, and the crude control of general presumptive limits on interrogatories

er size and focus on trial lawyering makes it a less favorable candidate than either the ALl or ABA.
This is because its membership is less diverse and its recommendations may not receive widespread
support. Subrin suggests the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws as a possibility, see Subrin, supra note 6, at 54, but I view this as a trial balloon that quickly should be shot
down. Although the Commissioners do fine work (e.g., the Uniform Commercial Code), they are primarily in the business of attempting to improve and make uniform the substantive areas of law which
traditionally have been regulated by the states. Discovery in federal litigation is, to state the obvious, a
matter of federal procedural law, and should be addressed by a group that specializes in federal civil
procedure. Although one can make too much of the often-blurred distinction between substance and
procedure, even substance-specific discovery clearly falls on the procedural side of the line. See
Carrington, supra note 96, at 2068 (asserting that despite difficult issues, substance-procedure distinction "is not meaningless").
138. This would include associations like the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, the
Chicago Bar Association, or virtually any state bar association. However, large state bars, such as
those in New York and California, are more likely to have the diversity and resources required for the
task.
139. For example, the Tort and Insurance Practice Section of the American Bar Association might
be quite apt for drafting discovery guidelines for insurance or tort matters, since the group appears to
have a balance of plaintiff and defense interests among its active membership. Many specialized bar
associations, however, are too one-sided in perspective and could not craft workable rules unless part
of a joint venture with an opposing organization. For example, many would not trust the American
Trial Lawyers Association, a plaintiff's lawyers group, to draft the product liability discovery
guidelines envisioned by Subrin. However, a joint effort of ATLA and the Defense Research Institute
might be effective in implementing the proposal.
140. See supra note 139. This sort of stratified pluralism could combine representatives of generally opposing lawyer's organizations and also include client interest groups. For example, the product
liability discovery guidelines committee might include not only ATLA and DRI, but also representatives of the insurance industry, the National Association of Manufacturers, and Ralph Nader's Public
Citizen, which has normally supported plaintiff's rights to make product liability claims.
141. See Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at part I.
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and depositions suggest that the Judicial Conference is not suited to experiment with Subrin's proposal.
The ALI is an elite and well-respected organization whose Restatements of the Law have become signature examples of the ability of reflective wisdom to influence actual legal doctrine and case outcomes. Nonetheless, the ABA is probably better suited than the ALI to implement
Subrin's proposal. There is nothing wrong with a little elitism where the
elite entity provides expertise, insight, and results (and the professional
consensus is that ALI's Restatements qualify on that score); however, the
recent round of discovery reform has been too driven by spectres of the
large, mushrooming "Frankenstein Monster" litigation spawning discovery
abuse. The 1993 Amendments, as Subrin points out," can be convincingly accused of changing the Civil Rules out of overreaction to fewer
than ten percent of all cases. Because practitioners in ALI are more likely
to be in the bar's elite of big firms with big cases (or highly successful
small plaintiffs' practices with big cases), I have some concern that an
ALI-led examination of Subrin's proposal would lead to guidelines aimed
more at large or complex litigation rather than generic discrimination or
products suits.
In addition, the nature of the suggested discovery guidelines is less
doctrinal and more practical. A cross-sectionally experienced group of the
profession should ideally pursue the guidelines, not just the most prestigious lawyers, judges, and scholars. Lawyers from large firms do appear
to be well-represented in ALI, but plaintiffs' counsel members are less
visible and more likely than the average plaintiff's lawyer to have a caseload that is unusually large, complex, or lucrative. This may not be the
optimal group for crafting rules for regular cases or determining how
courts should differentiate between regular cases and big cases.
Although state and local bar associations are certainly capable of initiating Subrin's proposal, they will suffer some of the same diversity problems as the ALI and may also have difficulty obtaining acceptance in view
of their nonnational membership. However, if a local bar association successfully crafts effective discovery guidelines, I am enough of a believer
in the marketplace of ideas to expect that their product would spread to
other regions.'43 However, this sort of grass roots distribution method is
likely to be slow and ineffective. Consider the many local rules of court
on discovery. Although some rules have attracted considerable attention,

142. See Subrin, supra note 6, at 45.
143. For example, after Subrin's presentation at the 1994 AALS Meeting, one commentator noted
that the Rochester, New York bar association was considering the adoption of some form of substancespecific discovery. If this group successfully formulates useful guidelines, there is no reason that their
product could not eventually gain widespread acceptance.
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such as the Southern District of New York's Local Rule 46 regulating the
timing of types of interrogatories and the Central District of California's
Local Rule 9 mandating that counsel meet and confer regarding discovery,
those rules have neither become national in scope nor have they served to
shape litigation practice as a rule promulgated by a body with a national
constituency might.
Specialized or interest group legal organizations have considerable
expertise in certain types of cases, yet they are almost always too partisan
on their topics of expertise to gain widespread following, even if they are
institutionally capable of drafting neutral and objective rules. Although
having interest groups or specialized bar associations work jointly on
discovery guidelines might reduce this difficulty, this joint approach seems
to me less preferrable than a program which would obtain their expert
input within the auspices of a respected national association. In addition, a
joint venture of partisan bar associations may yield "sweetheart deals"
which satisfy the lawyers' interests but not necessarily those of the litigants or society.
In my mind, this analysis leaves the ABA Litigation Section as the
entity most likely to maximize the potential of Subrin's proposal. The
ABA suffers from some of the same limits afflicting the ALI in that its
members-and certainly its activists-are disproportionately part of the
nation's elite bar. Lawyers who generally deal with bigger cases, work in
bigger firms, or make more money are not necessarily unable to draft the
sort of guidelines Subrin envisions, but the resulting product is liable to be
better and better received if the working group is cross-sectional. Despite
some lack of diversity, the ABA seems better suited to the task than the
ALL. ABA membership is neither selective nor restricted. The ABA currently contains approximately 325,000 members. The ABA Litigation
Section itself contains nearly 65,000 members.'" By contrast, the ALI
has a current maximum of 3000 members. Any admitted lawyer can join
the ABA while ALI members are selected after application, a process
which requires the recommendation of two current ALI members. Conventional wisdom holds that much more of the ABA's membership includes
"main street" lawyers, lawyers in sole practice, or lawyers in small firms.
Both the ALI and the ABA are, however, vulnerable to manipulation
and slanted electioneering. For example, the ALI's consideration of its
Principles of Corporate Governance' 45 was marked by what some observers regarded as an organized effort by some ALI members and corporate
management clients to shape the outcome of ALI Meeting votes on the
144. See Telephone interview with ABA Public Information Officer (Mar. 9, 1994).
145. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS

AND

RECOMMENDATIONS (1994).
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project.' 46 According to the anecdotal history of the Corporate Governance Restatement battle, a group of ALl members representing corporate
management flew to the Annual Meeting, stayed only long enough to cast
key procorporation votes, and then flew home. 47 This is not the sort of
deliberative, impartial assessment of legal policy the ALl Restatement process envisions. Nor should it be the way in which Subrin's posited task
forces determine presumptive discovery entitlements and limits. However,
such manipulation is a danger whenever an organization acts.
Nonetheless, I am relatively confident that a special ABA Litigation
Section task force, or group of substance-specific task forces, could impartially and fairly discharge the mission Subrin's article articulates. My
confidence stems in part from previous experience with a similar group,
the Rule 11 Subcommittee of the Trial Practice Committee of the ABA
Litigation Section, which drafted a balanced and useful set of guidelines
for Rule 11 practice.' This group met repeatedly during 1986-87 to
craft guidelines which the full Litigation Section and ABA House of Dele-

146. When adopting its Restatements of the Law, the ALI votes upon each section of a Restatement, and on acceptability of the Restatement as a whole, at its annual meeting. Although any ALI
member may attend the annual meeting and vote, my experience indicates that there is seldom more
than 15% of the membership on the meeting floor for a particular vote. Consequently, a well-organized but unrepresentative subgroup of ALI members can "pack" the meeting during voting on a particular Restatement provision. As a result, this subgroup can affect approval or rejection of the provision, even though the opposite result might be favored by the entire ALI membership or the legal
community at large. ALI membership divides into roughly one-fourth judges, one-fourth academics,
and one-half private practitioners. In my opinion, under normal circumstances, the Annual meeting
votes probably overrepresent the academics, whose schedules allow them to attend more frequently.
147. Several ALI members requesting anonymity have made such statements to me, but no private
practitioner ALI member with corporate clients has confirmed such electioneering. Whatever the cosmic truth, many ALI academic and plalntiff counsel members seem to believe the votes were purposely packed.
I am not opposed to electioneering of this type as long as it is founded on vigorous ideological
debate by members based on their actual views of an issue. I am unalterably opposed, however, to
members of any other purportedly nonpartisan organization making substantive policy as a result of
the electioneering of self-interested lawyers. Often these lawyers are attempting to get a better deal for
their clients or to protect their personal interest, with no real consideration of the merits of an issue.
As far as I can tell, the battle over the Principles of Corporate Governance was pitched because of both ideological and practical divides. On the ideological front, conservatives wanted little or
no legal restrictions on corporate form and operations, reasoning that market forces would reward good
or efficient corporate behavior and punish bad or inefficient operations. Liberals wanted more legally
imposed protection for shareholders and others who deal with corporations, contending that market
forces alone would not provide such protection.
On the practical front, allies of corporate management wanted less legal regulation, thereby
reducing the amount of litigation and liability that their corporate clients would face. Conversely,
lawyers who profit from suing corporations wanted them to face heightened legal regulation and liability. In terms of voters, the practical corporate allies appeared to have greater numbers than did the
practical corporate opponents. The ideological camps appeared more evenly divided.
148. ABA Section of Litigation, Standards and Guidelines for Practice Under Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 121 F.R.D. 101 (1988) [hereinafter Guidelines].
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gates subsequently approved and published in 1988. 41 Courts and commentators have cited the resulting Standards and Guidelines for Practice
Under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Guidelines), 0
and in my view, have constituted a very positive yardstick for interpreting
the 1983-93 version of Rule 11. To the extent that the 1993 Rule 11
Amendment does not materially alter the prior Rule, the Guidelines should
continue to be influential. The format of the Guidelines is to set forth a
series of interpretative principles for Rule 11 including explanations and
citations to illustrative cases and references to different or contrary approaches for particularly difficult or controversial matters. The reader of
the twenty-page document can quickly learn a great deal about Rule 11
and its application in frequently recurring disputes. The Guidelines also
denote the ABA's preferred approach to Rule 11 issues. In short, the
Guidelines document is a useful yardstick for applying Rule 11 and
functions in many ways like the ALI Restatements.
Although small, the Subcommittee that drafted the Guidelines contained a representative cross-section of private practitioners and law professors. The final product was a set of guidelines well within the mainstream of the litigation community's attitudes toward Rule 11. The group
was dominated to some degree (both numerically in terms of interest) by
commercial lawyers from large firms, but the drafting committee contained a majority of law professors. 5' Nonetheless, I do not think that
the Guidelines, as a whole, adopts a perspective favoring large firm clients, nor does it read like a law review article. It is practical, direct, and
restricted to the limits of Rule 1l's language. Perhaps this occurred because many of the lawyer members represent both plaintiffs and defen-

149. See id.
150. But they probably have not been cited as often as they deserve. My Lexis search indicated
only 16 specific citations. See, e.g., Pelletier v. Zwiefel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1575 n.88 (11th Cir. 1991);
Uselman v. Uselman, 464 N.W.2d 130 (Minn. 1990) (indicating that the Guidelines were cited in
support of the correct outcome).
151. Guidelines, supra note 148, at 105. The Subcommittee was chaired by Alvin K. Hellerstein of
Stroock & Stroock, and contained approximately 25 members from private practice and academia. Id.
Gregory P. Joseph, of the Fried, Frank law firm, not only chaired the Drafting Committee for the
Guidelines, but also served as the principal author. Id. Mr. Joseph also wrote a book on the subject.
See GREGORY P. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE (2d ed. 1994). Other

lawyer members of the Drafting Committee were Jerome Gotkin of Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris,
Glovsky & Popeo, P.L. (Boston), and Standish F. Medina of Debevoise & Plimpton (New York). The
academic members of the Drafting Committee included Professors Margaret A. Berger (Brooklyn Law
School), Maurice Rosenberg (Columbia University), Georgene Vairo (Fordham University), Ettie Ward
(St. John's University), and the author.
Of this group, Mr. Joseph was clearly the most influential in shaping the Guidelines, and he
invested the most time in the project. In my view, Mr. Medina was the second most influential. A
group working on Subrin's proposal would need members with more geographic and professional
diversity than this group.
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dants in litigation and are particularly thoughtful practitioners.
The full ABA Litigation Section did not merely rubberstamp the
Subcommittee's work. The Section gave the work substantial review, even
reversing the Subcommittee's view on a significant substantive point. 2
Consequently, I find the ABA Litigation Section's Rule I I Guidelines an
encouraging harbinger of how Subrin's proposal might be implemented.
However, by contrast to the Guidelines project which merely involved
interpretation, Subrin's proposal imposes a greater burden of
decisionmaking on whatever group attempts to implement it. This burden,
however, will fall on any group that seeks to determine the parameters of
substance-specific discovery. The successes of groups like the ABA Litigation Section Rule 11 Subcommittee suggest to me that the ABA is the
best organization to attempt to establish substance-specific discovery procedure. I suggest a task force initially devoted toward one important and
problematic discovery area. If the task force is successful in this area,
other task forces tailored to other subject matter areas should be convened.
My own preference is to address job discrimination first. This area would
test Subrin's thesis adequately because it is significant in scope, tends to
be divisive, exhibits judicial divergence in the caselaw, and can be complex.
I have chosen to analyze the ideal task force composition and process
in the products liability context because this is the area where Subrin
would prefer to begin. Ideally, an experienced litigator who has represented both plaintiffs and defendants in products claims would chair the task
force. An alternative approach would use cochairs, one a noted plaintiffs
lawyer and the other a respected defense lawyer. Another possibility is
appointing a respected judge as chair, although I do not advocate this
alternative. First, practical problems with the judge-as-chair alternative
exist. Judges are unlikely to want to take the time in response to a bar
association call and may find it unseemly to be acting as chief point per-

152. In its draft, the Subcommittee had taken the view that a legal paper, as long as it asserted a
position with adequate factual or legal support, could not violate the "improper purpose" prong of the
1.983 Rule 11 Amendment. The Litigation Section as a whole took the view that even technically
meritorious positions could violate Rule 11 if they were interposed in order to delay, impose costs, or
otherwise harass an opponent. Guidelines, supra note 148, at 121.
Since I was in the Drafting Committee minority on this issue, I was pleased to see the full
ABA Litigation Section employ such close scrutiny, as well as reach this particular result. In retrospect, I can see how this issue illustrates the need to ensure that a study committee not be too heavily
weighted toward the elite bar. Although I did not retain notes of the Subcommittee vote on the issue, I
do remember that the majority view was carried largely on the strength of the vote of members from
prestigious large firms. They took the position that a claim which was legally and factually sufficient
should be immune from sanction, even if it was being used to leverage a weaker opponent. If the
Subcommittee had more members who represent such weaker opponents, it might well have arrived at
the position ultimately adopted by the full, and presumably more representative, Litigation Section.
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son in reporting to a bar association and in defending task force proposals
to the association. Second, a judge presiding at task force meetings is
almost certain to limit the exchange of ideas, as even ordinarily dynamic
lawyers with no shortage of ego defer with servility to the judge's views.
Although this danger remains to some degree so long as there are any
judges on the task force, the stifling effect will be much greater where a
judge is the task force chairperson. 53
For example, the experience of some local Biden Bill committees was
that judges rejected some committee suggestions out of hand and did not
seem to take the lawyers seriously.'54 However, at least the suggestions
were made and pursued as a matter of public record. Where a judge chairing the task force opposes an idea, it is unlikely to receive the serious
consideration it probably deserves. The task force reporter should be a law
professor who has taught civil procedure, torts, or both. The committee
should include two or three members each from large products defense
firms, small products defense firms, large plaintiff practices, small plaintiff
practices, and general practice firms. In addition, manufacturers and insurers should be represented either directly, through either executives or inhouse counsel, or through lawyers who frequently act as outside counsel.
The task force should also include representatives of broader interest
groups such as the generally proplaintiff Public Citizen or the generally
prodefendant Manhattan Institute. A few members from law schools or
less partisan think tanks would round out the task force. The task force
might be well served by including one or more members of the ALl Advisory Committee currently considering revision of Section 402A of the
Restatement of Torts.
Ultimately, the task force should number approximately twenty-five
persons, a number similar to the ABA Litigation Section Rule 11 Subcommittee and similar to the working committees of the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York (in my experience, these working committees also consistently produce worthwhile and nonpartisan reports on legal
issues). Undoubtedly, a bulk of the guideline drafting would fall on the
Reporter who would work closely with a small drafting subcommittee.
Additional task force members or law student research assistants could
assist by exploring caselaw, much of which may lie below the surface of
reported cases.
Before drafting, the task force would confer to identify issues, propose
rough objectives and standards, and debate these matters, giving the Re-

153. Some of these dangers are reduced if a retired judge chairs the task force, although I remain
hesitant to endorse this job profile for the mythical task force chair.
154. See Lauren K. Robel, Grass Roots Procedure: The Turn to Localism in Civil ProcedureReform, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 879, 899 & n.]l 1(1993).
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porter and drafting subcommittee essential guidance in formulating a
working draft of discovery guidelines. Further consideration and task force
discussion would refine the working draft. The Litigation Section would
then approve the final guidelines and publication would make the guidelines widely available to the litigation community.
Of course, outlining this march to Nirvana is much easier than actually
taking the trip. The task force, to make a useful contribution, would need
to resolve certain issues such as the ordinarily relevant time period for
product liability discovery. For example, should courts permit product
liability plaintiffs to view five years of defendant records concerning the
allegedly offending widget? More? Less? Once a rule of thumb is chosen,
what must a plaintiff or defendant show to persuade a court to expand or
contract the historical limits of discovery? What sort of evidence or argument should be persuasive? The same tough issues loom concerning the
plaintiffs work history and prior experience with the widget and like
products, the defendant's economic status and motives, and the scope of
deposition practice.
The best means of providing guidance to the profession on these sorts
of nuanced issues is probably a format fusing the ALl Restatements and
the ABA Section's Rule 11 Guidelines. I envision a successful task force
articulating a set of clear discovery presumptions. The black letter portion
of the task force report should also articulate the standard governing a
court's departure from the guidelines. An accompanying note should explain the rationale for the resulting rule. This note, or a separate "comparison with case law" section, should cite the rule in relation to decided cases
or prevailing practices, identifying possible majority and minority approaches. The note should contain or introduce a separate illustrations
section akin to the Restatement format wherein the task force discusses
hypotheticals or anticipated problems, resolves the illustrations, and explains its rationale.
This type of product obviously cannot end difficult case-by-case discovery decisions. However, like the Restatements and the ABA Rule 11
Guidelines, it can make the court's task easier and the results more consistent by providing guidance and reducing decisionmaking costs. In addition, its clarity and comprehensiveness should encourage more informal
resolution of discovery disputes by setting a standard of reasonableness for
both plaintiffs and defendants. If courts utilize the discovery guidelines,
their informal influence will naturally increase. Unlike the 1993 disclosure/discovery amendments, the guidelines I envision will not merely urge
lawyers to cooperate in broad terms and hope for the best; they will provide more concrete standards of proper discovery behavior and a ready
means for judicial control over misbehaving lawyers.
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REVENGE: REVIVING LAWYER PUBLIC-SPIRITEDNESS

THROUGH ENSURED DIVERSITY AND PARTICIPATION

Perhaps the most famous bon mot ever delivered by a cartoon character is the aphorism of Walt Kelly's Pogo that "we have met the enemy,
and he is us."' 55 Although the phrase is now so oft-used as to appear
trite, it encapsulates nicely a substantial problem of the current litigation
reform debate. The component neighborhoods of my posited litigation
community are too narrowly focused and self-interested to work toward a
fair and feasible set of reforms.' 56 Judges want a magic bullet that will
keep them from being bothered by discovery and, for some odd reason,
seem more attracted to managing cases than to adjudicating them. Lawyers
want to take adversarialism to the brink for fun and profit without danger
of sanction. Clients want fast, accurate, and fair dispute resolution but
seem oblivious to the contribution of their own behavior to litigation problems.'57 Policymakers also want accurate and fair resolution but are unwilling to pay the price by, for example, advocating expenditures to maintain a sufficient number of judges and well-supplied courts. Instead, Congress passes legislation like the Biden Bill, a law which essentially does
nothing more than command judges and lawyers to try to fix the exaggerated problems of cost and delay through local action.
What, beside the obvious, is wrong with this picture? It illustrates a
litigation community unable to rise above self-interest. It also gives a
political, even partisan, spin to rulemaking. However, this spin is not
genuinely pluralist in that it does not give fair representation to all parts of
the community yet operates under the guise of a nonideological, objective
approach to rulemaking and litigation reform. I recently suggested some
relatively minor reforms in the rulemaking process that I believe will
institutionalize more openness, broader representation, and more delibera-

155. See WALT KELLY, POGO: WE HAVE MET THE ENEMY AND HE IS Us (1972) (containing
Pogo cartoon with this quote). According to Walt Kelly's obituary, the quote was first used in an
antipollution poster drawn by him in 1970. See Walt Kelly. Pogo Creator, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19,
1973, at 46. After its inaugural use during the early 1970s, the phrase quickly caught on, especially
with politicians, who invoke it as an illustration of the need for Americans to face up to pressing policy challenges, but ironically fail to do so themselves. It has also made it into law reviews. See. e.g.,
Peter B. Edelman, Toward a Comprehensive Antipover O , Strategy: Getting Beyond the Silver Bullet, 81
GEO. L.J. 1697, 1723-24 (1993); Laurence Tribe, Bicentennial Blues: To Praise the Constitution or to
Bur. It?, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 6 (1987); Aaron Wildavsky, Comment, "Help, Ma. I'm Being Controlled by Inanimate Objects," 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 253 (1991).

156. See Stempel, Cultural Literacy, supra note 15, at 313-38 (making this argument in more detail).
157. See Milo Geyelin, Soaring Legal Expense: Motorola Bemoans It But Runs a Big Tab. WALL

ST. J.,
Oct. 5, 1994, at Al (large corporation active in efforts to streamline litigation spends more than
$15 million on its own defense in one suit).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol46/iss1/4

42

Stempel: Halting Devolution or Bleak to the Future: Subrin's New-Old Proce
1994]

SUBRIN'S PROCEDUREAS A POSSIBLE ANTIDOTE TO DREYFUSS'S "TOLSTOY PROBLEM"

99

tive, less self-interested rulemaking.5 8 I now realize that to some extent,
I was suggesting a fusion of two leading models of rulemaking while perhaps giving short shrift to an emerging third approach.
Most viewers of the rulemaking process, a group comprised largely of
administrative law scholars rather than litigation experts, see three major
schools of thought on rulemaking. The first is the substantively rational
model.'59 In this model, rules are regarded as something akin to problems to be solved. The rulemaker proceeds according to a semiscientific
method by defining the task, articulating alternative means of addressing
the task, calculating the costs and benefits of the alternative means, and
then selecting the optimal alternative." The second school of thought is
the "pluralist' model.'6 1 In this model, rulemaking is not viewed as an
apolitically rational process with objectively correct answers.'
Rather
rulemaking is seen as an inherently political and distributional process in
which choices must be made that tend to favor some elements of society
at the expense of others. 63 Under the pluralist model, these various elements compete to dominate the rulemaking process, making alliances and
compromises along the way, and eventually resulting in rules that, if not
universally acceptable, are at least seen as politically legitimate and controlling."6 The third school of thought is the civic republican model."6
In this model, rulemaking is seen as an alternating mixture of both the
substantively rational model and the pluralist model. In deliberating about
rules, rulemakers are urged to seek the optimally rational system consistent
' 66
with political notions of the "common good" or "civic virtue.
One proponent of a civic republican approach to administrative law
regards it as "embrac[ing] an ongoing deliberative process, inclusive of all
cultures, values, needs, and interests, to arrive at the public good," which
is seen as the fundamental purpose of democracy. 67 Public good is not
the same as majority rule. Rather, civic republicans, at least in theory, see
158. See Stempel, New Paradigm,supra note 18, at 659, 739-54.
159. Id. at 659, 748-50 (summarizing suggestions of incorporating this approach for civil
rulemaking found in Laurens A. Walker, A Comprehensive Reform of Federal Civil Rulemaking, 61
Gao. WASH. L. REv. 455, 484-89 (1993)); see also Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393, 409-21, 428-34 (1981) (describing the rational model and
outlining areas in which it is appropriate for making policy in an administrative law context).
160. See Diver, supra note 159, at 413-21.
161. See Stempel, New Paradigm,supra note 18, at 751 & n.299.
162. See id. at 751.
163. See Jonathan Poisner, Environmental Values and JudicialReview after Lujan: Two Critiques
of the Separationof Powers Theory of Standing, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 335, 361-82 (1991).
164. See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 351-52 (1982).
165. See Poisner, supra note 163, at 382-88; Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justificationfor
the BureaucraticState, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1512, 1528-36 (1992).
166. See Poisner, supra note 163, at 382-88; Seidenfeld, supranote 165, at 1528-36.
167. Seidenfeld, supra note 165, at 1528.
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the public good as distinct from the mere aggregation of private preferences. The relevant community deliberates over the issue at hand and reaches
a conclusion. The conclusion may be a compromise or it may result from
a given position ultimately proving persuasive even
if it would not have
6
enjoyed majority support on an initial straw vote.'1
Thus, civic republican deliberation to achieve consensus differs
from negotiation to reach an outcome acceptable to all. Negotiation implicitly assumes a trade-off of private interests to arrive at a
compromise. Deliberation involves an ongoing attempt at persuasion that has the potential to
alter how all participants view the
1 69
debate.
of
subjects
contested
Even where consensus does not result, "the process of deliberation increases understanding of the positions of others and thereby facilitates outcomes that are accepted as closer to the ideal and hence more democratic
and just."'70
Civic republican theory, even in pure form, has drawbacks in that it
can be unduly dismissive of minority viewpoints that do not fare well in
the deliberative process. Civic republicanism also has substantial practical
weaknesses in that it presumes relative ease in defining the community
and unrealistically smooth fairness and candor in the community's deliberative processes. 7' Consequently, one may question whether American
rulemaking or politics should convert en masse to the civic republican
ideal. I am not assuming the burden of advocating complete, across-theboard republicanism in all aspects of litigation policymaking. Rather, I
want to see a greater dose of republicanism in rulemaking fused with a
more meaningful pluralism and a more rigorous substantive rationality.
One commentator suggests that to comport with republican theory,
government policymaking must do three things.' First, it must "engage
in public discourse about whether the action will further the common
good."' 73 Second, government policymaking must be accessible to the
public.'74 Third, it must treat any preference as legitimate until the deliberative process reveals it to be "inconsistent with universally shared norms

168. See id. at 1529.
169. Id. at 1529 n.89.
170. Id.
171. See id. at 1535-40. Although an advocate of the republican approach, Seidenfeld recognized
its limitations or "pitfalls." Id. For a more critical view of these pitfalls, see generally Stephen G. Gey,
The Unfortunate Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 801 (1993).
172. Seidenfeld, supra note 165, at 1529-30.
173. Id. at 1529.
174. Id. at 1530.
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of ethics or justice."'' 5 "Decisionmakers should evaluate the positions of
participants in the political process by the persuasiveness of their arguments and not by the identity, status, or number of individuals supporting
' In the end, reasonable members of the litigation comeach position."176
munity will probably find that the boundaries of these three schools of
thought blur considerably. In a large, modem, heterogenous nation and
litigation community, the republican deliberative process requires interest
groups and institutionalized pluralism. Without these two ingredients, we
will have no assurance that enough voices are being heard. However, the
interest groups must play fair and be willing to deliberate honestly.
Decisionmakers must play fair and be willing to listen with open minds.
Compromise should be adopted where it is a substantively rational accommodation of the public good rather than where compromise is merely an
acceptable tradeoff between politically powerful interests. Where consensus is unattainable, decisionmakers must make hard choices and subject
such choices to the tests of reasoned judgment, political acceptability, and
continued empirical evaluation.
The notion of rulemaking implicit in the Rules Enabling Act and as
practiced by the Judicial Conference has historically been a notion of
unstructured substantive rationality. The rulemakers act under an assumed
regime of political neutrality and reflect over rules changes, but they act
with insufficient rigor regarding public input, policy deliberation, the
process of rulemaking, and the means for evaluating the efficacy of
rules.'77 Although I see civil litigation rules as political and
distributional, I do not feel they are purely political nor do I feel that the
rules should be partisan.
There are substantively rational right and wrong answers to many
questions of how to structure and conduct civil litigation. Consequently,
the basic Enabling Act framework remains viable if both the rulemaking
institution and the litigation community undergo adjustments. The 1988
Amendments to the Enabling Act initiated many of these adjustments in a
pluralist manner.' These Amendments also opened up the rulemaking
175. Id. at 1531.
176. Id. at 1531.
177. See Walker, supra note 159, at 461-64. In particular, Professor Walker chides rulemakers for
failing to acquire adequate information about rulemaking, failing to consistently assess the costs and
benefits of new rulemaking early in the rulemaking process, and failing to self-consciously seek low
cost rulemaking solutions which benefit society the most. Id. Walker's reliance on the cost-benefit/substantive rationality approach may be appropriate for administrative rulemaking. This is because
administrative rules are designed primarily to regulate society. Litigation rules, on the other hand, are
primarily designed to ensure that individual members of society receive their due under society's substantive laws. Consequently, a completely utilitarian calculation of cost and benefits is probably not
appropriate for litigation rulemaking. Society should probably suffer some aggregate inefficiency to
limit individual injustice. See Stempel, New Paradigm,supra note 18, at 750.
178. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642,
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process to greater public participation and scrutiny. 79 More institutionalized openness and participation is necessary, particularly at the early stages of the process.'
In particular, rulemakers should listen earlier, more
closely, and more often to a wider spectrum of the profession. Thus, I
must disagree with Dreyfuss, as she appears to agree that "too many cooks
spoil the [rulemaking] broth." 8 ' My thrust, however, is not to further
fragment the drafting or decisionmaking but to expand the inputs and early
assessment available to rulemakers. More than cooks, I want many tasters
before presentation of the rulemaking banquet.
In making rules of civil litigation (regarding pleading, pretrial disposition, or discovery), rulemakers and the larger litigation community should
do more than analyze, listen, and debate. They should also seek a perspective useful to the entire litigation system. They should attempt to ensure
that their choices of reform preferences are not solely the product of personal political preferences or seemingly objective rationality that unfairly
treats some segments of the community.
They must take care not to plunge through the thin ice of their own
proposals by overweighing the benefits and excessively discounting the
costs of their own rulemaking preferences because of their own ideological
fudge points. As corny as it sounds, they must work even harder than they
previously have to identify the common good. In short, I am suggesting
that, in testing Subrin's proposed substance-specific discovery standards or
any other rulemaking reform, a dose of civic republicanism be added to
the basic framework of pluralist rationalism to which our civil litigation
policymaking process currently aspires. Implementing, or even attempting
to implement, Subrin's proposal may provide a prototype for better
rulemaking in the future.
V.

CONCLUSION

Perhaps my own fudge points have led me to naively conjure up a
representative and deliberative process that can never be achieved in the
real world. Nonetheless, I find Subrin's proposal exciting and worthwhile,
not only for its potential to improve discovery practice, but also because it
offers an opportunity to test a refined vision of civil litigation
policymaking. By testing Subrin's thesis in an open manner such as that
outlined above, the unhappy Tolstoyian families that grumbled along to-

4648 (1988) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (1988)).
179. See id.
180. See Stempel, New Paradigm, supra note 18, at 737-59 (suggesting that self-conscious analyses of perceived problems, and widespread input from the litigation community, precede draft
rulemaking so as to avoid the inertia of a small group capturing rulemaking reform initiatives).
181. Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 23-24.
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ward the 1993 Civil Rules Amendments might yet find a constructive
outlet for their energy, creativity, and even for their displeasure. Although
few would see the 1990s as a golden age of civil litigation, we need not
view the decade as a bleak expanse. Subrin's notion of substance-specific
discovery guidelines, created by integrative conversation within the litigation community, represents a most welcome opportunity for positive evolutionary change. This change might begin to halt the threatened devolution of litigation procedure and policy chronicled by Dreyfuss.
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